
**HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
AND PEACEBUILDING:
OPTIONS FOR CCIC POLICY FOCUS**

**Justine Foxall
CCIC Policy Team
December, 2003**

CCIC gratefully acknowledges the support of IDRC's Canadian Partnerships Program for this work.

This report may be photocopied freely for non-profit use. Additional copies may be ordered from CCIC:

*1 Nicholas Street, Suite 300
Ottawa, Ontario K1N 7B7
Canada*

*Tel: (613) 241-7007, ext. 300
Fax: (613) 241-5302*

Web site: www.ccic.ca

*© Canadian Council for International Co-operation
December 2003*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
1.0 INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE	2
2.0 OPERATIONAL AND CONCEPTUAL CONTEXTS	3
2.1 Geopolitical Shifts and Socio-Economic Factors.....	4
2.2 Definitions and Frames of Reference.....	11
3.0 IMPACTS OF THESE CONTEXTUAL FACTORS ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE	17
3.1 Convergence of Humanitarian Aid and Politics	17
3.2 New Goals and Allocations for Development Assistance.....	20
3.3 Tacit Acceptance of Human Rights Abuses	22
3.4 Forgotten Humanitarian Crises	23
4.0 CCIC MEMBERS	24
4.1 Characterisation of Non-Governmental International Co-operation Organisations	24
4.2 Canadian Civil Society Organisations — CCIC Members	26
5.0 OPTIONS FOR CCIC POLICY FOCUS	29
5.1 CCIC's Mandate and Resources.....	29
5.2 Options for Policy Work and Advocacy	31
6.0 SUMMARY	34
APPENDIX 1 — LIST OF ACRONYMS	36
APPENDIX 2 — LIST OF ORGANISATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED	38
APPENDIX 3 — HUMANITARIAN WORK ENVIRONMENT	42
APPENDIX 4 — CIDA DISBURSEMENTS OF IHA AND EMERGENCY FOOD AID	43
BIBLIOGRAPHY	45

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The past decade or so has seen members of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC), who engage in humanitarian action, dealing with more complex and “chronic” emergencies in conditions that are increasingly dangerous for the civilians they are assisting and for their own workers. As well, many of CCIC’s members who work primarily in long-term sustainable development are facing the challenges of post-conflict and “recurring conflict” situations: extreme poverty, vulnerability and the breakdown of the social fabric. Consequently, these organisations have initiated and implemented various activities with the intention of contributing to the re-establishment of peace (“peacebuilding activities”).

In 2002, CCIC undertook a survey of its members to ask them about policy work needed in the areas of humanitarian action and peacebuilding. This policy options paper is based on those consultations with CCIC members and other key actors in humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding, as well as on a review of current policy discussions of many human security related issues.

The objectives of this paper were to:

- 1) Outline the context of current policy issues in humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding as it applies to the over-arching goals of poverty reduction and human security; and
- 2) Set out some options for CCIC to enhance its policy and advocacy programs in these areas.

The paper describes two types of context in which humanitarian action and peacebuilding are currently conducted: the operational contexts of geopolitics and socio-economic environments and the conceptual context of definitions and frames of reference for humanitarian assistance and building peace. The changing nature of conflicts since the end of the Cold War, international economic policies and the relatively new “war on terrorism” are critical factors in shaping the context for humanitarian and development workers. This context also has shaped some of the frames of reference within which we work, in particular, the definitions of humanitarianism and peacebuilding.

The third section of the paper suggests that there are four main impacts of the operational and conceptual contexts: an increased politicisation of humanitarian aid; a setting of new goals for development assistance; the undermining of the legal framework for human rights and international norms; and a global amnesia about other major humanitarian crises as the “war on terrorism” dominates the international agenda. In the fourth section, a characterisation of non-governmental agencies with regards to humanitarian aid and peacebuilding is offered.

In conclusion, the paper outlines what CCIC offers to its members and proposes three possible areas of work, from among which CCIC could choose to focus its policy and advocacy efforts (limited resources preclude taking up all areas). This paper is intended as a starting point for discussion with CCIC members and other relevant institutions and persons to shape this work for the coming program period.

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

The past decade or so has seen members of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC), who engage in humanitarian action, dealing with more complex and “chronic” emergencies in conditions that are increasingly dangerous for the civilians they are assisting and for their own workers.¹ As well, many of CCIC’s members who work primarily in long-term sustainable development are facing the challenges of post-conflict and “recurring conflict” situations: extreme poverty, vulnerability and the breakdown of the social fabric. Consequently, these organisations have initiated and implemented various activities with the intention of contributing to the re-establishment of peace (“peacebuilding activities”). At the same time, donor discourse in recent months is explicitly linking development co-operation to the “war on terrorism”, which may have implications for both the allocation of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and its definition by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD / DAC).²

In 2002, CCIC undertook a survey of its members to ask them about policy work needed in the areas of humanitarian action and peacebuilding. This policy options paper is based on those consultations with CCIC members and other key actors in humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding, as well as on a review of current policy discussions of many human security related issues.³ CCIC’s intention is to enhance Canadian policy work in these areas in ways that add value to existing work of CCIC members and other coalitions such as the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC) and the Policy Action Group on Emergency Response (PAGER).⁴ CCIC situates these reflections within the framework of its overall *10-Point Agenda for Global Action Against Poverty*.⁵ Different thematic options are motivated by an increase in members’ pre-occupation with the impacts of complex humanitarian crises and with the accompanying policy implications such as the prospect of Canadian aid, along with aid of other donors, being viewed through the prism of a global security agenda.

¹ Refer to Appendix 3 for the Canadian Policy Action Group on Emergency Response (PAGER) description of the recent humanitarian environment.

² See the document on OECD’s web site at: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/4/16085708.pdf> and commentaries by BOND, July 2003 at <http://www.bond.org.uk/pubs/advocacy/gsdpaper.pdf> and CCIC, Brian Tomlinson, October 2003 at: http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002_aid_2003-11_ccic_commentary_dac_terror_prevention.pdf.

³ The initial consultation process was conducted by Francois Legault for CCIC between late October and early December 2002 and was done through in-person or telephone interviews based on a questionnaire with open-ended questions. This paper benefits largely from the draft document resulting from those consultations. (See Appendix 3 for a list of those interviewed.)

⁴ Launched in 1996, the CPCC is a network of Canadian non-governmental organisations and institutions, academics and individuals engaged in a wide range of activities related to addressing the causes and consequences of violent conflict. PAGER is a group of Canadian operational humanitarian agencies and NGOs working in humanitarian crises around the world. Its members constituted an informal grouping in 1999 to discuss policy and operational issues raised by complex humanitarian emergencies world-wide. All current PAGER members are also CCIC members except for the government participants from Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT).

⁵ See: <http://www.ccic.ca/e/001/agenda.shtml> or the 1998 publication: **in common** *A 10-Point Agenda for Global Action Against Poverty*.

In its role as a secretariat for its members, CCIC provides dedicated staff time and working group structures that link policy research and analysis with the operational contexts that our members encounter. Its mandate is to conduct research, disseminate information and create learning opportunities for its members, focusing on national and international policy development and on engagement with relevant policy actors.

The objectives of this paper are to:

- 1) Outline the context of current policy issues in humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding as it applies to the over-arching goals of poverty reduction and human security; and
- 2) Set out some options for CCIC to enhance its policy and advocacy programs in these areas.

We acknowledge that this paper in no way represents a comprehensive review of current issues nor an in depth analysis of all current policy discussions. We have not undertaken to do a further survey of CCIC members' policy work in this area since the survey conducted in the fall of 2002, thus may be remiss in not citing such subsequent work here. The subject matter is far-reaching and this paper is offered as a background and discussion starter.

The following section describes two types of context in which humanitarian action and peacebuilding are currently conducted: the operational contexts of geopolitics and socio-economic environments and the conceptual context of definitions and frames of reference for humanitarian assistance and building peace. The third section suggests that there are four main impacts of the operational and conceptual contexts. In the fourth section, a characterisation is offered of non-governmental agencies more broadly speaking, and CCIC members in particular, with regards to humanitarian aid and peacebuilding. Finally, the paper suggests what CCIC might bring to this context and proposes a number of options on which CCIC could focus its policy and advocacy work.

2.0 OPERATIONAL AND CONCEPTUAL CONTEXTS

Non-governmental and civil society organisations working toward the achievement of goals in *A10-Point Agenda for Global Action Against Poverty* are being challenged on many fronts. Take for example, Points Two (Upholding human rights), Four (Achieving gender equality), Five (Improving the lives of children), Six (Building peace) and Ten (Creating new opportunities for citizen participation) — these are particularly difficult to realise in situations where access to people who are suffering is limited, where governments have a tenuous legitimacy at best, and where the neutrality or impartiality of international aid workers is questioned.

By reflecting on the current context it is hoped that as a community of civil society organisations we will be motivated to also reflect on what is at stake. How have perceptions of (especially international) non-governmental / civil society organisations changed in the world? How have our own images of ourselves changed? What choices have we made and do we still need to make with regards to engagement in humanitarian assistance and the creation of a more just and peaceful world? What are the consequences and limitations of those choices? What frames of reference are we using to shape our mandates? The geopolitical and socio-economic dynamics within which civil society organisations currently conduct humanitarian action and peacebuilding activities strongly influence the answers to these questions.

2.1 Geopolitical Shifts and Socio-Economic Factors

This section outlines critical aspects of the geopolitical environment within which today's complex emergencies occur: the changing nature of conflicts, the contributing factor of global economic policies and the "war on terrorism".

2.1.1 The Changing Nature of Armed Conflicts

As the Berlin Wall came down and the Cold War thawed, hope rekindled for a more peaceful, secure and prosperous world. Paradoxically, while these positive events paved the way for the end of at least some conflicts, in others the disengagement of the superpowers provided for the emergence of a more "privatised" economy of war. Most of the 37 armed conflicts that were ongoing at the end of 2001 were **intrastate** conflicts (civil wars) although most internal wars are also internationalised and often involve the armed forces of more than one country.⁶ The Democratic Republic of Congo is a good example where the military forces of several neighbouring countries have been heavily involved in the fighting, even though the conflict remains largely an internal civil war. The impact and consequences of fighting (war refugees, as well as trade and other economic effects) ensure that war in one country inevitably produces consequences well beyond the sites of the fighting. Massive numbers of people have been displaced⁷ and civilians account for 90 percent of all victims of conflict since the end of the Cold War.⁸

At the beginning of the new century, about one-quarter and one-fifth of the states in Africa and Asia, respectively, were at war, and together these two regions were the site of almost 80 percent of the world's wars at the end of 2001.⁹ The following year, in 2002 the Middle East and Africa were the most war-torn regions, with more than one-quarter of the countries in each region (29 and 28 percent respectively) hosting armed conflicts on their territory.¹⁰ These conflicts destroy already limited resources, infrastructure and institutions of governance — often in contexts of fragile ethnic and social cohesion.¹¹ Consider that during the period 1992-2001, 45 percent of the states in the bottom half of the *Human Development Index 2001* were at war, while only 14 percent of the states ranked in the top half experienced armed conflicts during the same period. For states in the bottom third of the ranking, there was a greater than even chance (51 percent) that they were at war in the past decade.¹² While not always the case in the past, the war between insurgent groups and the Colombian government was the Western Hemisphere's single armed conflict, making the Americas, and especially North America, the region least

⁶ *Ploughshares Monitor*, Summer 2003. See: <http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/MONITOR/monj03e.html>.

⁷ 2.9 million people were internally displaced at the end of 2001 — more than 1.7 million more people than at the end of 2000, a year in which the number of internally displaced people also increased by almost 200,000. *World Disasters Report 2002*, p. 211.

⁸ Hilhorst and Schmiemann, 2002, p.492 and Safer World at: <http://www.saferworld.co.uk/media/stats.htm>.

⁹ Project Ploughshares, 2002. *Armed Conflict Report 2002*.

¹⁰ *Ploughshares Monitor*, Summer 2003.

¹¹ *Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative: Strategic Framework*. Canada. Canadian International Development Agency, 2002.

¹² Project Ploughshares, 2002. *Armed Conflict Report 2002*.

affected by war. In 2002, four states were the sites of more than one armed conflict. These were Indonesia (five), India (four), Philippines (two), and Iraq, now superseded by events, was the fourth with two conflicts. The Israel-Palestine conflict is listed as a single conflict, taking place on the territory of two states, Israel and Lebanon.¹³

The protagonists in these intrastate wars are less typically representing political grievances and injustice, such as they might have done in the wars of de-colonisation or ideological wars of the 1960s and 1970s. Rather, Project Ploughshares observes:

In a growing number of armed conflicts, armed bands, militia, or factions engage in criminal activity (e.g. theft, looting, extortion) in order to fund their political / military campaigns, but frequently also for the personal enrichment of the leadership and the general livelihood of the fighting forces. Thus, in some circumstances, while the disintegrating order reflects the social chaos borne of state failure, the resulting violence or armed combat is not necessarily guided by a political program or a set of politically motivated or defined military objectives.¹⁴

The *Armed Conflicts Report 2002* goes on to describe contemporary warfare as sporadic:

There are year-to-year changes in levels of fighting, but the social, economic, and psychological impacts of ongoing civil war, nationally and personally, are unrelentingly devastating. Of the current 37 conflicts, 27 of them (or almost three-quarters) began more than a decade ago, meaning entire generations of children are being denied access to meaningful education, health care is minimal, and economic development remains on hold.

The Overseas Development Institute's Humanitarian Policy Group (ODI / HPG) suggests that there are three major implications of the new political economy of warfare for those concerned with humanitarian assistance:

- ◆ It is extremely difficult to clearly identify different forces controlling territory, to negotiate with them, and to ensure that agreements regarding humanitarian access and conflict resolution are respected.
- ◆ With less buy-in from civilians for the armed groups' particular agendas, civilians become more vulnerable to violence at the hands of these groups and humanitarian access is more dangerous. (Reindorp, 2002, p. 30.)
- ◆ The variability in international political and military responses to conflict result in differentiated humanitarian response, both in the institutional arrangements in place to provide protection and assistance, and in the volume of resources available. (Reindorp, 2002, p. 30.)

¹³ *Ploughshares Monitor*, Summer 2003.

¹⁴ See Macrae, 2002, Chapter 1, p.5 where reference is made to the reliance on the steady extraction of natural resources. See also Partnership Africa Canada's work on "Diamonds and Human Security" at: <http://www.pacweb.org>.

In the 1990s, experiments in integrating humanitarian aid with a political / military response to conflict through the use of humanitarian aid, by omission or commission, in Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda and Bosnia, had extremely controversial results. NATO's (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) claim that its military intervention in Kosovo was a "humanitarian intervention" was equally controversial. As Joanna Macrae of the ODI notes (2002, p. 8): although "humanitarian assistance may no longer be considered to have a significant role to play in conflict resolution, [...] it may be seen to have an important role in *legitimising* international military and political interventions" (emphasis in the original). But are these interventions legitimate?

The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan challenged the world's nations in 1999 and again in 2000 to find a new consensus on how to approach the complex question of the "right of humanitarian intervention," that is, protecting human rights in the face of the sovereignty of states (The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, p.VII). In September 2003, Mr. Annan reiterated his concerns about the challenges to world peace. He announced the establishment of a High-Level Panel of eminent personalities to "recommend clear and practical measures for ensuring effective collective action, based on a rigorous analysis of future threats to peace and security, an appraisal of the contribution collective action can make, and a thorough assessment of existing approaches, instruments and mechanisms, including the principal organs of the United Nations."¹⁵

In response to his earlier calls for collective reflection and consensus on how to protect human rights, the Government of Canada played a key role in establishing The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). This Commission sought a global consensus on a range of questions — legal, moral, operational and political — that impinge on the debate. The Commission concluded that the primary responsibility for protection of people lies with the state concerned. Only if that state is unable or unwilling to fulfill this responsibility, or is itself the perpetrator, do other actors take responsibility for protection. Some propose that the concept helps avoid the politicisation of humanitarian action implicit in the notion of "humanitarian intervention":

The 'responsibility to protect' approach allows us to avoid the language of 'humanitarian intervention' and the dangerous politicisation of humanitarian action. By clarifying the proper roles and responsibilities of the various players, we can be clearer about the specific role and purpose of humanitarian organisations and principles: to try to save lives and alleviate suffering. This is not to be confused with, or merged into, other parallel aspects of international response, such as conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Although the report focuses specifically on the roles and responsibilities of states, the 'responsibility to protect' approach should also help humanitarian actors to be clearer about their own protection responsibilities.¹⁶

¹⁵ United Nations. <http://www.un.org/News/dh/hlpanel/press-release-041103.pdf>; <http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/sg2eng030923.htm>.

¹⁶ See this book review on ODI's Humanitarian Practice Network at: <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2422>.

But a key question remains: what current body, beyond the UN Security Council with all its political limitations, has international legitimacy to decide that a state is not meeting these obligations? While one might define legitimate grounds for intervention based on the “responsibility to protect”, can intervention itself avoid “politicisation” in the real world of violent conflict involving state actors? We will return to the dilemma of clarifying roles and responsibilities of various players in the discussion of terms and frames of reference.

The work of the Commission was largely completed before the events of September 11, 2001, and was not framed to guide the policy of states when faced with attack on their own nationals or the nationals of other states within their borders. The events following September 11th, the war in Afghanistan and then the war against Iraq, have kept the debate about sovereignty and “responsibility to protect”, very spirited.¹⁷ For instance, at a “Progressive Governance Summit” of 14 centre-left governments in July 2003, a consensus about the “responsibility to protect” was not reached but the discussions continue.¹⁸

In this paper, however, we wish to simply bring to the fore what may be an emerging international norm — the “responsibility to protect” implies not just intervention but a whole continuum of obligations: prevention, reaction, and rebuilding. While it may be fraught with political difficulties in the absence of a reformed UN system that acts as legitimate arbiter, it nevertheless usefully raises the broader sets of obligations that can guide action on the part of the international community short of intervention. The findings of the recently appointed High-Level Panel may also shed light on whether the post-September 11th period opens new spaces for and commitment to collective action.

2.1.2 Economic and Political Context for Conflict

The internal and external consequences of economic and political policies have further exacerbated these trends in conflict over the last twenty years. For example, economic policy conditions such as those imposed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) on their loans to developing countries (known as Structural Adjustment Programs — SAPs) have resulted in massive economic social disruption and increased debt burdens for those countries. Even the IMF and World Bank “Highly Indebted Poor Country” initiative, introduced in 1996 and 2000 to reduce debts to an arbitrarily determined “sustainable” level, further locks governments into the “lend and pay” cycle.¹⁹ The impact of SAPs on public resources and on poverty essentially undermines the capacities of states in the poorest countries to govern effectively. Many would argue that the “fragility” of states has been made more precarious by two decades of SAPs, although we recognise that this conclusion needs further macro-economic analysis, research and debate.

¹⁷ Evans (2003), co-chair of the Commission applies the principles developed by the ICISS to the questions that the war on Iraq has raised. See reference in the bibliography.

¹⁸ Several leaders, including German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and Chile’s Ricardo Lagos, disagreed strongly with proposed language in the communiqué that could have been used by British Prime Minister Tony Blair to justify the war in Iraq even if no weapons of mass destruction were found. (Alan Freeman, *Globe and Mail Update* Monday, July 14, 2003 and Patrick Wintour and David Munk, *The Guardian*, July 15, 2003.)

¹⁹ The 50 Years is Enough Network, pp.5, 16-17.

At the September 2003 meeting of the Africa-Canada Forum,²⁰ participants examined the example of the Côte d'Ivoire, where the result of 20 years of SAPs undermined the functionality of the traditional patronage system of the state by reducing resources available to politicians (except for the senior leadership). It also failed in economic terms to both affect production and reduce poverty, and it could not affect an admittedly corrupt political system by creating conditions for an alternative.

The way reforms were introduced in the Côte d'Ivoire reduced political options. Through emphasising administrative rationalisation and privatisation, the political goal of providing better services to the poor majority in the population became sidelined. The reforms failed to build legitimacy for a new regime, nor were they able to re-establish the political foundations for social cohesion. Reduced by downsizing and privatisation, there was no capacity in state structures for social mediation roles.

Political reform in the 1990s (the donor's good governance agenda) further depoliticised this West African state by focusing on an administrative / technical approach to governance. There was no scrutiny of the political system where senior leadership continued to exploit their positions for privilege and personal benefit. Good governance as "re-engineering of state structures" camouflages real issues of governance for the poor — a national program for recovery and a new articulation of legitimate political processes. Bendaña (2003, p.7) asks:

Has it not begun to finally dawn upon the 'experts' that their macro-political and macro-economic parameters were and are a source of maldevelopment, poverty and violence? [...] Indeed, employment of the minimalist criteria can become a source of conflict in itself, as it turns attention away from the real problems and inequities that are begging not for 'administration' but for solution.

The Côte d'Ivoire example has much to teach us about how international economic policies can undermine and delegitimise governments that are already under significant strain to govern well. Weakened government allows an environment of political instability to grow and endemic poverty results in many more losses than the number that die in the theatres of humanitarian emergencies.²¹ When we keep in mind a broad definition of human security (embracing all sources of social and economic insecurity associated with poverty, unemployment and disease), chronic economic, social and political crises raise challenges for both humanitarian agencies and development organisations as they face increasingly complex emergencies sustained over many years.

For humanitarian organisations they raise the long-standing debate on a "relief to development" continuum, but with new emphasis on reducing vulnerability not to natural disasters but chronic conflict. For organisations with mandates that focus on longer-term development for sustainable

²⁰ Campbell, March 2003. The Africa-Canada Forum is a CCIC working group. A full report of this three-day meeting is available on CCIC's web site: www.ccic.ca.

²¹ CCIC, March 1996.

poverty reduction, they must understand these programs within the context of protracted civil / military instability and extreme poverty. For some this requires improved understanding and skills in peacebuilding; for others they must apply themselves to better understand how people's livelihoods are affected in these situations and how vulnerable people cope.²²

2.1.3 The “War on Terrorism”

The conflation of concerns relating to the provision of humanitarian assistance and explicit strategies to build peace may not be new, but since September 11, 2001, and the ensuing “war on terrorism”, the dilemmas and debates that these approaches raise have intensified. Prior to September 11, 2001, the South was well acquainted with terrorism and, with few exceptions, had put it in its place — very much subsidiary to other development issues and challenges, including responses to a broader context of violent conflict.²³ Terrorism as a specific and explicit tactic on the part of politically motivated individuals or organisations (including the state) has been around for hundreds of years and, at best, represents a very small element in the context of violent conflict.

Despite several protocols and conventions on terrorism and work underway in the General Assembly of the United Nations, the international community has not been able to agree on definitions of terrorism or distinctions between its forms (largely due to the Israel / Palestine conflict). The EU, the USA and other countries have devised very broad working definitions of terrorism for national legislation responding to the “war on terrorism.”

In the aftermath of September 11th, terrorism has become central to the domestic and international security pre-occupations of Northern Governments, particularly in priorities for American foreign policy. The foundation for these priorities seems rooted, not in a geopolitical analysis of the relative threat of terrorism to citizens, but in a set of ideological and apocalyptic “moral judgements”, largely driven by the vision of a powerful faction within the current US administration, who are eager to assert American pre-eminent power globally. Terrorism has been given dimensions of “evil” versus “good”, constituting a universal threat, not unlike the threat of massive nuclear destruction that oriented four decades of the Cold War global politics.

Terrorism, as random acts of deadly violence against civilians whose purpose is to create fear and insecurity for surrounding populations, clearly constitutes illegal criminal acts that are unambiguously morally reprehensible and devoid of any political rationale. Terrorism can have

²² Longley and Maxwell (2003) note that the practical questions of how people manage in these situations inevitably relate to more conceptual issues — in particular, the link between short-term humanitarian objectives and longer-term developmental objectives — as well as ethical concerns relating to the necessity of providing livelihood support in principled ways that do not exacerbate existing tensions relating to the conflict or that may inadvertently promote political instability or have other unintended negative impacts. At the conceptual level, such concerns have been articulated in terms of the need to link right-based approaches with livelihoods approaches, or to develop a better understanding of the political economy of conflict as part of the process of determining appropriate forms of livelihood support. The limited scope of this paper unfortunately cannot take up these broader implications for long-term development work.

²³ This section benefits from the work by Tomlinson, October 2003, *A CCIC Commentary on “A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Key Entry Points of Action”*.

serious consequences for the affected societies, including legitimate movements of people struggling to realise their rights within these societies. But September 11th notwithstanding, terrorism is not a pervasive tactic undertaken by significant numbers of groups and individuals seeking change through violent means. Far more people and societies continue to be affected by persistent internal conflict and violence, which have impacted large civilian populations with incalculable human and materiel costs over the past decade.

In September of 2002, the United States released a far-reaching security strategy (*The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*). Among the priorities elaborated by this strategy are: strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism; working with willing “friends and partners” to defuse regional conflicts; promoting global economic growth through free markets and free trade; and, providing new levels of assistance to developing countries where governments have demonstrated “real policy change.”²⁴ It raises a new strategic posture for the US, pre-emptive warfare:

For centuries, international law recognised that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of pre-emption on the existence of an imminent threat — most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. [...] they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction[...] The targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare. [...] To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively. (*The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002, Section V*)

This argument under girded the United States’ “pre-emptive” war against Iraq. Some liberals in the US take up this line of argument suggesting that American imperialism is a necessary project because it puts US power at the service of human rights.²⁵ Based on this *National Security Strategy*, the US government is undertaking dozens of operations, some secret and some simply unnoticed, conducted by the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency — US), the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation — US), the diplomatic corps and small, elite military squads in places as far-flung as Mauritania, Uzbekistan and the jungle between Venezuela and Brazil. The risk, as journalist Doug Saunders put it, is of course that the United States may end up providing aid and encouragement to brutal regimes that repress their people as it did during the cold war to the Taliban in Afghanistan.²⁶

²⁴ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, p.6.

²⁵ See David Rieff’s review of *Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan* by Michael Ignatieff in “Taking up the American’s burden,” *The Globe and Mail* [Toronto], September 30, 2003.

²⁶ Saunders, “The fourth world war,” *The Globe and Mail* [Toronto], September 6, 2003, pp. F6-7.

Within six months following the declaration of the end of the war against Iraq, the two foremost icons of “neutrality” and “impartiality” became the targets of deplorable bomb attacks in Iraq: the United Nations office and the International Committee for the Red Cross. The rhetoric of pursuing “terrorists” has not abated and, as we will see in section three below, this has impacts on political and development strategies and goals. These recent incidents which targeted humanitarian “symbols” underscore the importance of frank discussions among civil society organisations, government and military actors about the protection of humanitarian space in this environment so taken up by a concern for “global security”.

The focus in this part of section two has been on the operational context: a world of shifting geopolitical alliances, struggles for legitimate sovereignty in the face of extreme power imbalances, chronic conflict, and much uncertainty. The changing nature of conflicts, the apparent weakening of the UN and the strong unilateral decisions of the US have affected the definitions and practices of humanitarian action and stretched the boundaries of traditional development co-operation, requiring deliberate conflict-sensitive analysis. The next section begins to unpack key terms in the conceptual context, with the aim of drawing the reader’s attention to the main debates and dilemmas of definition and inviting him / her into the discussion.

2.2 Definitions and Frames of Reference

Given the shift in global power and the strains on international relationships in the current theatres of conflict, we need to clarify our definitions and assumptions of four key terms: humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding, human security and humanitarianism.

2.2.1 Humanitarian Assistance

Analysts and development practitioners generally agree that a traditional definition of “Humanitarian Assistance” varies mainly in the scope of activities around a core concept.²⁷ Nevertheless, it is this scope that has slowly evolved to include a broader range of activities. The mandate of CIDA’s (Canadian International Development Agency) International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) program, identifies humanitarian assistance as “[an intervention] to alleviate human suffering caused by natural disasters and conflict. This includes basic human needs such as health, water and sanitation, shelter and household items, protection, education, recovery of livelihoods and disaster preparedness activities. It also includes the care, maintenance, and eventual repatriation and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons.”²⁸

²⁷ International points of reference are, minimally, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Oslo Guidelines of 1994 and more recently the Humanitarianism and War Project. (See *Development Initiatives*, Chapter 3.) These definitions seem clear. However, as the proportion of humanitarian assistance for complex emergencies has grown, distinctions that donors make between humanitarian and development action in financial flows are not so easily distinguished. The range of activities that are funded under the “humanitarian aid” rubric has increased. Donor approaches may include addressing root causes, prevention and mitigation of conflict, reconstruction and transition. See also: Buchanan-Smith, 2003; Curtis, Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) *Report 10*, 2001; Hilhorst and Schmiemann, 2002.

²⁸ http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf.

The “recovery of livelihoods” and the work of “reintegrating refugees and displaced persons” already begin to touch on the work of transition and long-term development. The Oslo Guidelines of 1994 also includes “rehabilitation activities” in its definition of humanitarian assistance (*DI*, p.58). The more recent Humanitarianism and War project added “the protection of human rights” to its definition of humanitarian assistance (*Development Initiatives*, p.58).²⁹

Other expressions such as “relief work” and “emergency response” are often used as synonyms to humanitarian assistance. For the purposes of this paper we will use the CIDA definition as a reference point for humanitarian assistance.

2.2.2 Peacebuilding

We can look back to the launching of the United Nations’ *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992 as a milestone in developing current understandings of “peacebuilding”. This Agenda first put forward the concept of “human security,” whose achievement is ultimately the goal of peacebuilding activities. The term peacebuilding has come to encompass a host of practices that range from military intervention for the purpose of ending violent conflict to community-based mediation and conflict resolution gatherings. In Canada, Robert Miller (1992) presented several case studies of Canadian government and civil society development and humanitarian assistance in conflict or post-conflict contexts, noting even then the militarisation of development as a result of wide-spread human rights violations.

Since 1992 deliberate international peacebuilding has “*broadened* laterally in terms of the policy sectors that are implicated, *deepened* in terms of engagement with the internal workings of societies, and *lengthened* in terms of stages of conflict when it operates” (Lund, 2003, p.2, italics original). What peacebuilding is or is not and what peace entails can mean different things for different people — for local stakeholders, national governments and international donor agencies.

Since the early nineties humanitarian aid and development has featured in a number of Canadian policy discussions that responded to this new policy environment for peacebuilding. In 1994 and 1995, Canadian Foreign Affairs and Defence policies focused on the concept of “Security in a Changing World”. Concern about this Canadian policy framework was discussed during a conference convened in November 1995 by the *Ad Hoc Working Group on NGOs and Peacebuilding* (the precursor to the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee — CPCC). The conference concluded with a series of recommendations on policy / advocacy, operational and structural questions relating to peacebuilding.³⁰

²⁹ <http://hwproject.tufts.edu/> The Humanitarianism and War Project was an independent policy research initiative based at Brown University’s [Watson Institute for International Studies](#) in Providence, Rhode Island, and is now part of the [Feinstein International Famine Center](#) at the [Gerald J. and Dorothy R. Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy](#) at Tufts University. The project is underwritten by funds from practitioners themselves — United Nations organizations, government aid agencies, and private relief groups — and by interested foundations.

³⁰ *NGOs and Peacebuilding: Lessons Learned and Next Steps*, 1995, p.1. This conference received support from CIDA, IDRC, CCIC and a range of civil society organisations. Operational recommendations focused on practices of conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance delivery and the integration of humanitarian aid, long-term development and peacebuilding. The structural recommendations led to the formation of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordination Committee, a network of Canadian non-governmental organisations and institutions, academics and individuals engaged in a wide range of activities related to addressing the causes and consequences of violent conflict.

With regards to policy / advocacy, participants recommended that roles of governments, donors and NGOs (non-governmental organisations) be renegotiated and a multi-sectoral, multi-disciplinary approach to conflict prevention and transformation be adopted — one which would organise the division of labour to recognise the most effective and efficient division of labour among the various actors. They also recommended improvement of resource allocation processes, clarification of terms such as peacebuilding and conflict resolution, and the establishment of criteria by which to design and evaluate peacebuilding initiatives.

Today, the *Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative* of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) provides a definition of peacebuilding in its *Strategic Framework*:

Peacebuilding is the effort to strengthen the prospects for internal peace and decrease the likelihood of violent conflict. The over-arching goal of peacebuilding is to enhance the indigenous capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence. Ultimately, peacebuilding aims at building human security, a concept which includes democratic governance, human rights, rule of law, sustainable development, equitable access to resources, and environmental security. [...] Peacebuilding may involve conflict prevention, conflict resolution, as well as various kinds of post-conflict activities. It focuses on the political and socio-economic context of conflict, rather than on the military or humanitarian aspects. It seeks to address this challenge by finding means to institutionalize the peaceful resolution of conflicts.³¹

This broad definition describes many of the activities in which CCIC's members engage to build peace.³² Early involvements of civil society organisations in these kinds of peacebuilding efforts were undertaken primarily during times of transition between emergency and long-term development. The 1990s saw the greatest expansion of peacebuilding projects in traditionally more humanitarian or long-term development organisations. Yet in situations of complex, ongoing, conflict-related emergencies, conflict prevention and mitigation activities have also been placed programmatically under the rubric of “peacebuilding”, blurring the lines between emergency aid, peacebuilding and long-term development.

A much wider debate on the topic of peacebuilding was opened at the meeting organised by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of *An Agenda for Peace*. IDRC's partners in South Africa, Central America and Palestine had raised concerns about the kind of peace being constructed in their societies, who was benefiting from those processes and who was being left out, and who was driving the global agenda.³³

³¹ Canadian International Development Agency. *Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative: Strategic Framework*. Ottawa: 2002. In 2000, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade renewed its commitment to “human security” by launching the Human Security Program with \$50 million over five years for domestic capacity building, diplomatic leadership and advocacy, multilateral mechanisms and country-specific initiatives that would increase people's safety from violence. CIDA continues to support peacebuilding activities through the Peacebuilding Unit with an annual budget of approximately \$10 million.

³² For a more thorough discussion and definition of post-conflict peacebuilding, see the Bendaña (2003) and Lund (2003) papers noted in the bibliography.

³³ IDRC, *What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Reflections on the State of Peacebuilding Ten Years After the Agenda for Peace*. Working Paper No. 7. January 2003.

In a paper prepared for that meeting, Bendaña (January 2003, pp.4-6) refers to two different concepts of peacebuilding offered by Henning Haugerudbraaten which he finds constructive. Concept one, as he calls it, is “characterised by the short-term involvement of the international community, centralism and political measures primarily undertaken by external agents, even though attention is paid to the consent and support of indigenous players. [...] [C]oncept two entails long-term efforts by mainly indigenous actors to promote political and economic development, and a sustainable solution to the root causes of the conflict.”

Bendaña holds that the first concept makes the equation between peace and conflict resolution or conflict management / prevention, whereas the “South” would make the equation of peace with socio-economic justice:

Peace is the presence of justice and peacebuilding entails addressing all factors and forces that stand as impediments to the realization of all human rights for all human beings (p.8).

These different definitions rise from different understandings of the root causes of conflict. Too often the “North” does not acknowledge the role of external or global structural constraints and forces acting upon national scenes of conflict and, Bendaña adds, neither do the governing elites in the South whose own interests are usually linked economically to the international marketplace. He argues that most people in most countries of the South, who find their livelihood impacted by decisions and policies determined elsewhere, would ground that understanding of root causes in “a systemic critique of neo-liberal corporate globalisation and a US-dominated international political order that we refer to as South” (p.5).

Bendaña suggests that “amidst the prospect of a new stage of never ending intervention and war, peacebuilding has the particular responsibility to remind one and all of the destitution caused not only by war but by globalised economic war (p.6).” This argument echoes the analysis of the Côte d’Ivoire case by Campbell and points toward the impacts discussed in section three of this paper.

What is important to note and on what we must deliberate is this contested definition of peacebuilding. As Bendaña remarks, “peacebuilding is an inexact term. Its meaning depends on one’s vantage point, and who gets to do the talking (p.8).” Whose definition will guide civil society’s engagement in building peace? How can CCIC’s work with its members to ensure that we are listening to our partners in the South and working with them to achieve a just peace?

2.2.3 Human Security

In the words of Nicola Reindorp, (2002, p.30) former Research Fellow of the ODI’s Humanitarian Policy Group: “At its narrowest, [human security] connotes a concern with the protection of human beings, rather than the protection of borders, whether from internal or external threats [...] At its broadest, [...] it embraces all sources of social and economic insecurity associated with poverty, unemployment and disease.” The narrow definition implies military or policing protection and / or intervention. The broader understanding requires long-term development commitments. CCIC and its members would for the most part identify with this

broader interpretation, maintaining that: “human security means enough to eat, a clean environment, a chance to earn a fair share. It is not a concern with weapons but rather a respect for human rights and dignity.”³⁴

In its approach to human security, DFAIT (*Freedom from Fear: Canada’s Foreign Policy for Human Security*, 2002, p.2) focuses on the more limited definition stating that “human security means freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, safety or lives. [It] encompasses a spectrum of approaches to prevent and resolve violent conflicts, to protect civilians where conflicts do exist, and to increase the capacity of states to ensure security for their populations.” Its five policy priorities for human security have no explicit reference to socio-economic well being: 1) public safety, 2) protection of civilians, 3) conflict prevention, 4) governance and accountability, and 5) peace support operations. For the purposes of this paper, we will use the term in its broader sense unless specifically noted.

2.2.4 Humanitarianism

The backdrop to the operational challenges of implementing humanitarian aid is that the definition of humanitarianism itself is being questioned and expanded. On one hand, the traditional humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence are being vigorously challenged by those who would integrate humanitarian and political responses to conflict.³⁵ On the other hand, it is recognised that more complex and political humanitarian crises need much more than an emergency response. As a result we have seen “humanitarian” action come to include concerns such as human rights, good governance, conflict management and peacebuilding. A challenge for CCIC’s policy work will be to determine the implications of this conflation of concerns for the humanitarian and development work of our members and therefore for policy proposals to government. A few main points regarding this “new humanitarianism” may be helpful to fill in the background to the debate.³⁶

First, the genesis of the current debate can be situated in 1971 when Médecins sans frontières (MSF) was established on the basis of two principles: “freedom of criticism” and “right of intervention,” breaking from the predominant International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) position at that time.³⁷ Second, the changing nature of conflicts since the end of the Cold War

³⁴ **in common** A 10-Point Agenda for Global Action Against Poverty, 1998.

³⁵ On the basis of recognising a common humanity, the Red Cross adheres to the operational principles of impartiality, that is assisting without discrimination except on the basis of needs, giving priority to the most urgent cases, and neutrality, that is without taking sides in conflict or engaging in political or social controversies. (Chandler, 2001, p.679) The Red Cross maintains the principle of independence from the political objectives of governments.

³⁶ Many of the following points were raised at a conference (*Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and Dissension*) organised by Overseas Development Institute at the University of Leeds and CAFOD, London, February 1, 2001. Devon Curtis compiled the Humanitarian Policy Group report of the conference. David Chandler’s article is also important for its discussion of needs-based and rights-based approaches to humanitarian assistance.

³⁷ Chandler, 2001, p. 685. The “freedom of criticism” refers to the denunciation of human rights abuses in the context of a humanitarian crisis. The “right of intervention” views sovereignty as subsidiary to attending to human needs and rights to relief.

and the more recent geopolitical shifts since September 11, 2001, certainly bring new elements to be considered in defining humanitarianism and implementing humanitarian assistance. Some would say that traditional humanitarian agencies have not reacted successfully to these changes in the nature of conflict and security — sometimes actually exacerbating or prolonging the conflict and creating dependency.³⁸ Furthermore, many new humanitarian organisations have emerged since 1971 increasing the number of people and organizations interpreting and defining humanitarian principles practically and theoretically. This too widens the debate and makes the definition less clear.³⁹

A conference at which the dilemmas of politics and humanitarian aid were debated⁴⁰ implied that an element of the argument can be stated in the question: Should humanitarian assistance be considered an act of charity or an internationally and legally agreed obligation? Participants in the conference also asked the question whether there is a hierarchy of rights with some rights taking precedence over others. Briefly the debate around the first question is this:

[On one hand], grounding humanitarian action in rights, duties and laws, rather than in principles, makes the values of humanitarian work explicit to everyone, and gives humanitarianism an integrated moral, political and legal framework to affirm universal human values. Rights also dignify individuals, rather than patronising them. Victims of conflict become claimants of rights, rather than objects of charity. Therefore... a rights-based approach allows humanitarians to connect with a “proper politicisation” that goes beyond humanitarian protection, and that is grounded in natural rights and justice.

[On the other hand,] a rights-based approach...conflicts with the universal right to relief aid, and can mean that it becomes morally justifiable to leave individuals without aid for political reasons. [It] demands that all humanitarian aid be judged on how it contributes to the protection and promotion of human rights, thus allowing for conditionality in the delivery of relief. (Curtis, 2001, p. 15.)

³⁸ NGOs themselves have taken a courageous self-critical look at their work in “The Local Capacities for Peace Project” of the Collaborative for Development Action, Inc. This has been a collaborative project of a number of international agencies, including bilateral donors, non-governmental agencies and agencies of the United Nations. The Project sought to identify the ways in which international humanitarian and / or development assistance given in conflict settings may be provided so that, rather than exacerbating and worsening the conflict, it helps local people disengage from fighting and develop systems for settling the problems which prompt conflict within their societies. Since its inception in 1994, the project has gone through four phases: case studies, feedback workshops, implementation and mainstreaming. The lessons learned from the case studies were published in a book entitled *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace — or War*. Forty feedback workshops were then held in conflict zones and at aid agencies’ headquarters that permitted aid agencies to test the lessons against their own experience and to suggest additions and amendments to improve them. The implementation phase, from 1997 to the end of 2000, saw fourteen agencies participating in implementing the “Do No Harm” Framework in specific projects in conflict areas. These agencies found the Framework useful to inform and improve their day-to-day decisions. The current mainstreaming phase aims for an uptake of the framework and the ideas behind it throughout several participating agencies. Oxfam-Québec, Alternatives and World Vision (at the international level) were three of the pioneers in using this approach.

³⁹ Hilhorst and Schmiemann (2002) conducted research among MSF staff and their lived experiences, interpreting principles and priorities in response to demands placed on them in the field.

⁴⁰ *Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and Dissension*, organised by Overseas Development Institute at the University of Leeds and CAFOD, London, February 1, 2001.

To counter this, it can be argued that one can (and surely many humanitarian workers do) respond to the universal right to relief aid without taking a patronising posture. Furthermore, David Chandler (2001, p. 700), presently Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Westminster, argues that a rights-oriented politicisation of humanitarian aid has led to even greater leverage over non-Western societies. He contends that NGOs and international institutions increasingly assume the right to make judgements about what is right and just, and ultimately which claimants of rights will have their rights upheld.

Ultimately this conference appealed for clarity in the language of humanitarianism and in the roles, responsibilities and principles underpinning humanitarian action and we would suggest that this may be a piece of work in which CCIC, with its members, may also want to engage.

3.0 IMPACTS OF THESE CONTEXTUAL FACTORS ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

What then are the impacts and implications of this multi-dimensional context for development and humanitarian assistance? First, it has sharpened the politicisation of humanitarian aid. Second, it has prompted the setting of new goals for development assistance and may be skewing long-term aid allocations in favour of emergency assistance and the global security agenda. Third, it has undermined the legal framework for human rights and international norms through domestic anti-terrorism legislation and the tacit acceptance of human rights abuses in pursuit of this war on terror. Finally, it has sidelined other major humanitarian crises as the “war on terrorism” takes centre stage. Each of these impacts is discussed briefly below.

3.1 Convergence of Humanitarian Aid and Politics

Participants at the February 2001 *Politics and Humanitarian Aid* conference acknowledged that although humanitarian aid has always been a highly political activity, the relationship between humanitarian aid and politics is changing. Humanitarian assistance seems to be increasingly tied to political objectives, “becoming an integral part of donors’ comprehensive strategy to transform conflicts, decrease violence and set the stage for liberal development” (Curtis, 2001, p.3) and, we would add, strategic foreign policy interests unrelated to humanitarian needs. Mark Duffield, Professor of Development and Conflict at the University of Leeds, UK, argues that the convergence of the social concerns of aid agencies with the security concerns of Western developed states is at the heart of an emerging system of “liberal international governance”.⁴¹ He describes this governance in terms of the relationship between “metropolitan” (Western developed) and “borderland” (developing) states. Although domestic practices of “borderland” countries might be beyond the capacity and legitimacy of “metropolitan” states, the “metropolitan” states have used humanitarian aid as a “technology”, a way to help “metropolitan” states govern in new ways — through the non-territorial and public-private networks associated with humanitarian aid.

⁴¹ As communicated by Curtis in *Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and Dissension*, 2001, pp.4,6.

Without going into a debate on global economics we can note a few indications that the “good governance” that donors seek to support is indeed tied to a neo-liberal consensus of market integration and this is what is believed will overcome poverty. We saw this explicitly stated in one of the priorities of the United States’ *National Security Strategy*: “promoting global economic growth through free markets and free trade”. Bendaña’s (2003, p.5) critique of “peacebuilding” echoes Duffield’s concern:

Peacebuilding... as broadly applied by multilateral organisations as well as governments North and South tends to be top-down, externally and supply-driven, elitist and interventionist. [...] Peacebuilding in this context becomes an inherently conservative undertaking seeking managerial solutions to fundamental conflicts over resources and power, seeking to modernise and re-legitimise a fundamental status quo respectful, reinforcing and reflective of a national and international market-oriented political economy.

Recall the example of Cote d’Ivoire (Section 2.1.2 in this paper) and the contested nature of the term “good governance” — is it to be viewed primarily in administrative / technical terms or in terms of real issues of governance for the poor, such as national programs for economic recovery and a new articulation of legitimate political processes?

We would surmise that were Official Development Assistance (ODA) to be used as an explicit tool of foreign policy it would potentially undermine ODA’s over-arching goals, which are reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals. It is disquieting, therefore, to note the following developments: In Canada, Minister for International Co-operation Susan Whelan, declared that to be effective “assistance must be part of co-ordinated diplomatic, military, trade and aid responses. [...] the increasing policy coherence encouraged by this coordination is essential to strengthening aid effectiveness and promoting sustainable development.”⁴² We worry: “This assistance is co-ordinated for what purpose and according to whose agenda?”

In the UK (United Kingdom), resources of the Department for International Development (DfID) the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence are combined in support of common conflict-prevention objectives in, for example, the Africa Conflict Prevention Fund.⁴³ And in the European Union’s draft Constitution development co-operation and humanitarian aid have been discussed as “instruments” of the external relations policy of the Union (including the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Defence Policy). This bundling has been criticised by CCIC’s counterpart, UK civil society organization BOND (British Overseas NGOs for Development, who note:

⁴² Whelan, Susan. “Advancing Human Security: The Role of Technology and Politics.” The 53rd conference on Science and World Affairs. Halifax and Pugwash, July 17, 2003.

⁴³ Curtis, p.6. See also numerous references to this kind of joining of political and development assistance aims in the *HPG Report 11* listed in the bibliography.

A qualitative differentiation between the ‘tools’ of development co-operation and humanitarian assistance on the one hand, and the instruments of foreign policy on the other, is absent. The Constitution makes explicit reference to the use of humanitarian aid in the fight against terrorism. (July 2003, Box 2.)

In Canada, the new leadership of the Liberal government has been talking about reforming the foreign policy making process, giving a great deal of attention to a “whole-of-government” approach, which potentially could bring greater coherence to the management of international assistance, conflict and post-conflict management, and trade and investment promotion agenda. It has been suggested that this approach would more effectively draw the interests of multiple Canadian stakeholders into the development and delivery of international policy. However, if our foreign policy goals are interpreted too narrowly, or focus on Canadian strategic interests in the South, such an approach is likely to undermine the potential for significant Canadian initiatives in support of the Millennium Development Goals and policies to enable global poverty eradication. (Tomlinson, September 2003.)

Examples of how over-arching goals of human development have been subordinated to the “global security” agenda are numerous. One case became apparent soon after September 11, 2001 — Pakistan, which had been subject to sanctions because of nuclear testing, human rights abuse and the military coup in 1999, received a substantial increase in development aid when it agreed to support the international coalition against terrorism.⁴⁴ This theme is taken up again in section 3.3 in relation to a tacit acceptance of human rights abuses.

A number of conclusions that emerged from that February conference are even more urgent today:

- ◆ The encroachment of politics into humanitarian space should be noted and understood.
- ◆ There is a conflict between the principles of neutrality and impartiality and conflict management.
- ◆ Humanitarian aid should not be a substitute for effective political action.
- ◆ Humanitarian agencies must be clear about which principles underlie their work and politically conscious of the role they choose.
- ◆ That the language of humanitarianism must be clear: “Aid should only be called humanitarian when it is provided in accordance with humanitarian principles. Agencies may choose to engage in political and conflict-reduction interventions, but these should not be called humanitarian. Similarly, the term “humanitarian intervention” really refers to military intervention and should not be confused with humanitarianism.” (Curtis, p. 17.)

⁴⁴ BOND, July 2003. The IBON / BOND November 2003 paper *Development and the ‘war on terror’* describes trends in US, Japanese, Australian and European Union aid — both military and development. The cases of aid to Indonesia and the Philippines are especially worrisome.

3.2 New Goals and Allocations for Development Assistance

The global “war on terrorism” is influencing discussions at the donors’ forum for international development co-operation: the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). BOND reported that in a January 2003 seminar of the DAC there was broad consensus that objectives of aid needed to be considered that would go “beyond just maximising the growth impact of aid on poverty reduction.” One example of such an objective was “to prevent violent conflict, *including terrorism*”.⁴⁵ Since that seminar, a policy statement approved by all DAC aid Ministers has been released that illustrates in unmitigated terms how the prevention of terrorism must be a priority of development co-operation. The document describes key entry points for action and, in so doing, elevates terrorism prevention to a “relevant development objective”.⁴⁶

The DAC paper points to an emerging “securitisation” of aid in donor countries as military, political and humanitarian responses merge in a “whole-of-government” approach.⁴⁷ The lens through which donors assess different potential responses to these crises are giving priority to Northern security interests and terrorism. The document rightly calls for improved policy coherence on the part of donor governments, particularly where “OECD governments *might overlook severe abuses taking place* because they need co-operation from that particular country’s government” (emphasis added).⁴⁸ The international community has an obligation, rooted in international human rights law, to attend to **any** derogation of international human rights standards, not just the most extreme abuses.

Around the world, many in civil society have already called for a clear purpose for aid in ending global poverty.⁴⁹ The limited resources devoted to supporting this goal have been declining and for many donor countries continue to orient their aid programs to foreign policy objectives. At the same time, donors have paid considerable attention to improving the effectiveness of aid to tackle poverty. Donors are also committed to achieving the Millennium Development Goals, for which the United Nations suggests \$50 US billion are required in **additional** aid each year.

Even those donors who have promised increases are far off this mark. The inclusion of multiple objectives for aid, which are only tangentially (if at all) related to ending poverty, compounds current concerns for focusing the impact of aid on poverty. Increases in aid should not be used to justify spending aid on other priorities.

⁴⁵ BOND, July 2003, p. 3, emphasis in the original.

⁴⁶ *A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Key Entry Points for Action*. OECD / DAC, 2003.

⁴⁷ This section benefits largely from the analysis written by Brian Tomlinson, October 2003. http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002_aid_2003-11_ccic_commentary_dac_terror_prevention.pdf

⁴⁸ This statement seems to demonstrate a shocking disregard for international humanitarian law admitting that severe abuses might be overlooked. DAC Guidelines and Reference Series. April 2003, p.19. Available at: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/4/16085708.pdf>.

⁴⁹ See, for example, various issues of the *Reality of Aid Report*, available at www.realityofaid.org.

If donor priorities are overtaken by a northern driven agenda that targets significant resources to the “war on terrorism” and its extension to other forms of conflict it may negatively affect legitimate donor strategies to help prevent increasingly pervasive violent conflict, particularly in Africa. It may also distort the focus of development co-operation away from the eradication of poverty and the needs of poor countries.

Of special concern is the proposal in the DAC paper that ODA eligibility criteria be enlarged. Opening the door of ODA eligibility in the context of this policy statement will have a profound impact on the integrity of ODA as a resource for poverty eradication. There certainly are many legitimate actions by northern governments (diplomatic, military, technical exchanges) for preventing conflict and constructing conditions for peace that derive from state obligations to international human rights law. Some of these actions may be directly related to poverty reduction and are already included. However, including the disbursements for a broader range of activities for the prevention of terrorism in ODA will only dilute the public notion of aid and its purpose and will effectively divert scarce ODA resources away from poverty eradication. We would argue that many current actions (police, security and military strengthening) to prevent terrorism, linked by some governments to a “war on terrorism”, clearly fall outside the boundaries of effective strategies for conflict prevention.

Australia and Denmark have already made combating terrorism an explicit goal of their development aid budgets (BOND, July 2003). The concern of course is that aid spent on security projects in developing countries both undermines the integrity of aid focused on poverty and may reduce the amount of aid available for poverty reduction priorities. This will become clearer as donors’ actual figures become available for 2002-2003 some time next year.

With evolving goals for development assistance, several studies have examined the trends in financial flows to humanitarian and development aid. Randel and German report on the portion of humanitarian assistance that is currently classified as part of official development flows given by governments to a list of developing countries defined by the DAC.⁵⁰ Some trends in humanitarian assistance can clearly be identified:

- ◆ The volume and increasing share that humanitarian assistance has of aid as a whole. (From 1970-1990 humanitarian aid was less than three percent of total ODA. Throughout the nineties this trend increased and reports for 2001 showed that humanitarian aid represented ten percent of ODA and had done since 1999.)
- ◆ The dominance of a small number of donors. (Ten countries provide 90 percent of humanitarian aid. The USA provides as much as the next four — UK, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands; however, on a per capita basis Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Luxembourg are by far the most generous.)
- ◆ The trend towards bilateral control of humanitarian resources.
- ◆ Earmarking and the concentration on a limited number of high-profile emergencies.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Randel and German, *HPG Report 11*, Chapter 2, p. 19 and *Development Initiatives*, 2003, pp.3,14.

⁵¹ Earmarking is the practice by which donors designate to which emergencies their multilateral contributions should go. This matters because the capacity of international organisations to deliver humanitarian assistance in unpopular or politically difficult places is affected by the availability of **unearmarked** funds. Thus, although 2001 DAC figures suggest that 60 percent of aid was spent bilaterally and 40 percent multilaterally, in reality not all of this 40 percent is distributed at the discretion of the multilateral agency. DI, 2003, pp.6-7. See also Smillie and Minear, April 2003.

One of the conclusions of the ODI's HPG *Report 11* states: "While the UN looks set to remain at the core of humanitarian coordination in most crises, in the more strategically significant areas a more bilateralised response is likely to prevail. This has implications for the impartiality of the humanitarian system as a whole, and for the ability of the UN to maintain a global role" (Macrae, 2002, p.17). Iraq is a dramatic case in point.

Looking specifically at CIDA and the evolution of its humanitarian assistance envelope, available figures show that during the first five years of the nineties, total CIDA humanitarian assistance (including emergency food aid) represented, on average, 17.5 percent of CIDA's total disbursements each year⁵². That proportion fell to an average of 13.8 percent for the second half of that decade. The figure for fiscal year 2000-2001 was even lower at 12.0 percent and dropped to 10.4 percent in 2001-2002. Yet, the general assessment among CCIC membership is that the proportion of humanitarian assistance work within their overall activity has increased during this same period. To reconcile the two observed tendencies, a CIDA program officer confirmed that, on average, the proportion of humanitarian assistance funding channelled by CIDA through NGOs (as opposed to other channels) had increased since the mid-nineties.⁵³

3.3 Tacit Acceptance of Human Rights Abuses

Many donor countries have adopted anti-terror legislation since the attacks on New York and the Pentagon in 2001. In Canada, Bill C-36, the Anti-terrorism Act, was rushed through parliament with little debate in December of 2001. The USA Patriot Act preceded it in October 2001, giving new powers to both domestic law enforcement and international intelligence agencies. There is growing evidence that similar legislation throughout South East Asia is intended to serve these purposes, with notable financing from the Australian aid program in a number of instances.⁵⁴ It is suggested that the goals of anti-terrorism legislation and related initiatives are driven predominantly by a desire to appease US demands to harmonise security, immigration and refugee, and border restrictions in the interests of global operability of the American security apparatus. A Canadian coalition⁵⁵ suggests that our response to terrorism needs to be **proportional** (taking into account the extent of the apparent risk) and **sharply focused** (for anti-terrorism purposes).

Amnesty International's 2003 Annual Report notes that contrary to promoting a more secure world, these anti-terror laws undermine the rule of international law and shield governments from scrutiny. (BOND, July 2003.)

⁵² Refer to Humanitarian Assistance Table in Annex 4.

⁵³ Survey results as reported in the draft CCIC report by Legault, 2003.

⁵⁴ See for example, Chirawatana Charoonpatarapong, "War against Liberties", *Focus on the Global South*, www.suaram.org/apsn; "ASEAN Governments Create More Terrorism through Violence and Repression, say activists", Forum Asia Statement at ASEAN Summit, Bali, October 6, 2003; ACFOA [Australian Council for Overseas Aid], "Aid Budget 2003-04 Overview and Analysis", May 2003 www.acfoa.asn.au.

⁵⁵ International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, *In the Shadow of the Law*, response to Justice Canada's annual report on the application of the Anti-Terrorism Act (C-36), April 2002. CCIC is a founding member of the Monitoring Group.

Countries whose poor human rights records had previously limited their eligibility to receive development aid, have in the past two years received **extended** military aid as they signed on for the alliance against global terrorism. BOND cites Human Rights Watch's report on increases in US military assistance to countries such as Tajikistan and Saferworld's report of the UK arms export controls that were relaxed for countries which had received highly critical human rights assessments. On a distant front, Mauritania, a former French colony ruled by military strongman Maaouyah Ould Sid Ahmed Taya, whom opposition parties accuse of brutal repression of political dissent, has capitalised on the United States' new suspicion that al-Qaeda cells may have moved south into the Sahara. Mr. Taya was quick to claim his country was under threat and consequently received a large share of a US\$100 million military aid package for friendly West African nations in the summer of 2003. Need it be said that Mr. Taya's military regime faces a popular opposition in elections scheduled this year? (Saunders, 2003, p. F7.) These moves compromise the long-term goals of development, conflict prevention, peacebuilding and human rights.

3.4 Forgotten Humanitarian Crises

The phenomenon of "forgotten humanitarian crises" is directly linked to the convergence of politics and aid, as well as the impacts on the goals of aid. Humanitarian responses vary "in scale and form" (Macrae, 2002, p.10) according to the strategic importance of the areas in question. In testing the wide-spread assumption among practitioners that humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and proportionality remain paramount as drivers of donor behaviour, Smillie and Minear (2003, 6-7) learned instead that "humanitarian policies — to the extent that they are articulated — are a subset of, and subordinate to, the foreign and domestic policies (and politics) of donor countries". Each donor country has particular foreign policy interests influenced by historical ties, interests (and pressure) of other donors or unique political opportunities such as Canada's hosting of the G-8 in July 2002.

Although lack of access is often given as a reason for weak donor response in "forgotten" cases, it is often because the situations are of little interest to anyone and there are no compelling reasons beyond humanitarian need to become involved. Countries such as Chechnya and Tibet, despite having significant humanitarian crises, have been virtually ignored by the international community. Liberia received only half of the minimal US\$15 million requested in the 2002 UN Consolidated Appeal and the response to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) appeal that year was even worse (Smillie and Minear, 2003, p.7). MSF is renewing its campaign for support of the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo because of the very low level of international attention paid and assistance given to the millions of people suffering in chronically unstable conditions. Reports coming from humanitarian workers in Liberia say the situation is far from resolved, although there is some measure of stability in Monrovia.⁵⁶ Stephen Lewis, the UN's Special Envoy on HIV / AIDS in Africa, deplored the fact that US\$3 trillion could be raised in a matter of weeks for the war on terrorism, but not US\$65 billion over five years to prevent literally millions of deaths from AIDS.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Reported at a meeting of PAGER, September 15, 2003.

⁵⁷ Murray MacAdam. "Beating AIDS in Africa: Uganda Offers Hope," *International Development and Environment Article Service* (IDEAS), July 2003. More recently Stephen Lewis noted that "the rich world, annually, spends 600 times as much on defence as Africa has for AIDS, and 350 times as much on agricultural subsidies as Africa has for AIDS. (Statement at the Panel: "The Politics of Resource Allocation" at ICASA: XIIIth International Conference on AIDS and STIs in Africa, 25 September 2003).

This section has briefly considered some of the impacts and implications of the current geopolitical dynamics and conceptual frameworks on humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding. We saw that the politicisation of humanitarian aid is an area of critical concern for civil society organisations. We also showed how goals for development assistance are being affected and may skew long-term aid allocations in favour of emergency assistance and the global security agenda. Third, the legal framework for human rights and international norms is being undermined through domestic anti-terrorism legislation and the tacit acceptance of human rights abuses in pursuit of this war on terror. Finally, we have noted how other major humanitarian crises have been sidelined as the “war on terrorism” takes centre stage.

How are CCIC member organisations experiencing these impacts operationally and how might CCIC work with them to address the policy agenda that seems most pressing?

4.0 CCIC MEMBERS

This section recalls the experience of CCIC members and the mandate of CCIC, including the resources at its disposal. Several options are then presented that may offer a basis for discussion of priorities for CCIC to enhance policy work in the areas of humanitarian action, peacebuilding and human security, in the context of issues raised in the previous sections.

Policy concerns regarding humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding do not affect all of CCIC’s members equally. However, to the extent that policy decisions made at national or international levels about these two domains affect Canada’s ODA or Canadian organisations’ freedom to operate according to their mission statements; this discussion will interest all CCIC members. Those members who are more directly concerned will make policy decisions with regard to the current context for humanitarian and peacebuilding action from the perspective of their organisational missions and mandates. How can we help inform the wide scope of policies and entry points that these missions and mandates might embrace?

4.1 Characterisation of Non-Governmental International Co-operation Organisations

In Abby Stoddard’s analysis of the challenges and trends facing humanitarian NGOs, she assesses a typology proposed by Weiss for describing the NGO “community” and proposes a new typology.⁵⁸ Since these two typologies are based primarily on assessments of large European and American NGOs, this may be too general a characterisation for the range of CCIC’s members, but it does offer a point of departure in understanding our “community”. The first reproduces Weiss’s typology (Macrae and Harmer, 2003, page 28):

⁵⁸ Research Associate, Center on International Co-operation, New York University. Analysis in Macrae and Harmer, eds., ODI, *HPG Report 14*, 2003, Chapter 3.

Figure 1. “Political Spectrum of Humanitarians and their Attitudes Toward Traditional Operating Principles” (1999)

	Classicists ↔ Minimalists ↔ Maximalists ↔ Solidarists
Engagement with political authorities	Eschew public confrontations ↔ Advocate controversial public policy
	Avoid taking sides ↔ Take the side of selected victims
Impartiality	Deliver aid using proportionality and non-discrimination ↔ Skew the balance of resource allocation
Consent	Pursue as sine qua non ↔ Override sovereignty as necessary

This typology is perhaps one that is familiar or intuitive even if it is not profound in its analysis. Among CCIC members in Canada, it could be said that the Canadian Red Cross would tend toward the “classicist” tradition and Médecins sans frontières Canada would tend toward the “solidarist” side. That being said, we recognise that it is more appropriate that members identify for themselves whether this typology is relevant to their operations and policies. The weakness that Stoddard identifies in Weiss’s typology is that it has “tended to exaggerate philosophical differences, while downplaying basic practical similarities” (in Macrae and Harmer, 2003, p. 28). She notes that it also obscures the fact that, even within one organisation, different principles may be stressed at different times.

For example, although the ICRC and MSF have very different positions regarding the value of public advocacy and political action, Stoddard would hold that they both are rooted in the same “Dunantist” tradition — named after Henri Dunant who launched the Red Cross movement. That is, ICRC and MSF are independent from government and enjoy close co-ordination in the field. Neither does it distinguish between MSF’s brand of “disobedient humanitarianism” and the “Wilsonian state humanitarianism” of most US NGOs, the latter being those NGOs that see a basic compatibility between humanitarian aims and US foreign policy. (The term originates with US President Woodrow Wilson’s ambition of projecting US values and influence as a force for good in the world.)

Stoddard’s own categorisation (see Figure 2), looks at the question of what sort of community NGOs would like to institute among themselves: “one based on shared codes and rules and eventually a formal accountability structure, or a more atomistic structure containing a collection of independent and diverse entities” (p.28). The PAGER coalition has participated in the Sphere project;⁵⁹ thus most of its members could be said to be in favour of rule-based coordination. It

⁵⁹ Phase I of the Sphere Project was initiated in 1996 by the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) and InterAction, the US development NGOs coalition. Members recognised the need to improve the quality of aid provided to people affected by disaster, and, the accountability of agencies to their beneficiaries, their membership and their donors. The handbook, *The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response* was published in its preliminary edition in 1998. The handbook was the result of a comprehensive process of evaluation of the levels of aid essential to human dignity in the core areas of disaster response. Phase II of the Project was carried out in 1998 and its goal was to undertake dissemination and implementation of the handbook, both domestically (in the US) and internationally. Thirteen government donors, including CIDA-IHA, and the agencies themselves, funded Phase II. The Canadian Red Cross (CRC) implemented training and awareness-raising activities for key members of Canada’s humanitarian community. As a result of the dissemination activities carried out in phase II, there has been an increased dialogue and collaboration amongst Canadian agencies and donors concerned with humanitarian action. There has also been an enhanced capacity of Canadian humanitarian organisations to respond to emergency appeals in a way that is timely, co-ordinated and appropriate.

might be necessary, however, to consider each organisation’s humanitarian or emergency aid department apart from its long-term development programs to determine whether the approach is more Wilsonian or Dunantist, at least in terms of time horizons and service delivery emphases.

Figure 2. Lines of Demarcation Within the Secular NGO Traditions

In favour of rule-based coordination	CARE Save the Children US IRC	Oxfam Save the children UK Concern Worldwide
Independent / rule-averse	Americares other in-kind organisations	Médecins sans frontières Action contre la Faim Médecins du Monde
	Wilsonian More dependent on and cooperative with governments Short time horizon Service delivery emphasis	Dunantist More independent of and oppositional toward government Long time horizon Advocacy emphasis

4.2 Canadian Civil Society Organisations — CCIC Members

The Canadian Council for International Co-operation represents a broad cross-section of Canadian civil society organisations within which there is considerable humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding programming. Out of 93 civil society organisations listed in the 2003 *Who’s Who in International Development*, 42 conduct emergency, relief and humanitarian assistance programming and 51 have peacebuilding programs. Eight of the PAGER members, who are also CCIC members, engage in humanitarian and peacebuilding programming. Although a breakdown by sector expenditures is not available to us, these eight members represented approximately CDN\$247 million dollars in private source funding (corporations, individuals, foundations and other NGOs) for a grand total of about CDN\$459 million funding revenues for international co-operation in 2001.⁶⁰ CCIC also has 43 members who are engaged in a related programming area of human rights.

At present, the main vehicle for discussions of strategic directions related to humanitarian assistance is the PAGER coalition,⁶¹ although more of their collaboration has been on operational issues rather than policy advocacy. Among PAGER members at least two issues stand out as priorities: 1) roles and responsibilities of military and humanitarian actors in

⁶⁰ These eight organisations are: Development and Peace, Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI), Canadian Lutheran World Relief, Canadian Red Cross, CARE Canada, Mennonite Central Committee Canada, Oxfam-Québec and Save the Children Canada. Other PAGER members — Canadian Foodgrains Bank, Médecins sans frontières and Oxfam Canada — also engage in emergency relief, but not “peacebuilding” programs. In addition and related to these two sectors of HA and PB, all except one of these organisations also have some human rights programming.

⁶¹ Members of PAGER who are also members of CCIC presently include: Alternatives, Canadian Foodgrains Bank, Canadian Red Cross, CARE Canada, Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperation, Development and Peace, Mennonite Central Committee Canada, Médecins sans frontières Canada, Oxfam Canada, Oxfam-Québec, Save the Children Canada, UNICEF Canada, and World Vision Canada.

complex emergencies, and 2) addressing the “transition gap” for funding humanitarian aid through to stabilisation and long-term development activities (Legault, December 2002). In broader terms, many of the members who were consulted also deemed important the integration of humanitarian and peacebuilding agencies into the larger discussion of the role of civil society in CIDA’s international co-operation policy and aid effectiveness approach.

For issues related to peacebuilding, the CPCC has expanded activities in a number of its working groups and its annual consultations have examined the broader political implications of current world events and their impact on global security. Participation in CPCC working groups demonstrates the commitments of CCIC members to peacebuilding themes and issues. The most common peacebuilding theme in which our members engage is the protection of civilians, especially war-affected children and women. Both of these topics are being addressed in CPCC working groups: Children and Armed Conflict and Gender and Peacebuilding.

The Children and Armed Conflict Working Group (CACWG) brings together international development agencies, human rights organizations, academic researchers, youth groups and concerned individuals.⁶² The goal of CACWG is to improve protection for the security and rights of children threatened by armed conflict by enhancing the work of individual NGOs and professionals through information-sharing; entering into policy dialogue with Canadian government departments and agencies; conducting capacity-building activities; and raising awareness in Canada about how children are impacted differently by war.⁶³ The CACWG aims to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights law by closing the gap between commitments and actual practice. In addition, the group undertakes a number of other initiatives including: building political support for the enormous contribution children can make to building peace in their communities and encouraging the integration of this perspective into policy design; identifying pertinent situations that are current priorities on Canada's foreign policy agenda; and advocating for children in each of the following four stages: conflict prevention, human security during conflict, conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction and reintegration.

The Gender and Peacebuilding Working Group (GPWG) is a network designed to strengthen collaboration among Canadian organizations, activists, and academics by providing a forum for the exchange of resources; facilitating dialogue between and among civil society and government; and contributing to the direction of programming and policy in relation to gender equality and peacebuilding.⁶⁴ This working group engages in activities that raise public awareness about how age and gender can determine how people are affected by conflict, build political support for the contribution women make to building peace and encourage their equitable and effective participation and integration into national, regional and international fora. They also advocate for the integration of a gender perspective in Canada's foreign policy agenda, particularly in conflict prevention, human security during conflict, conflict resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction and reintegration.

⁶² CCIC members of the CACWG are: World Vision Canada, Save the Children Canada, UNICEF Canada, Canadian Red Cross and Médecins sans frontières Canada.

⁶³ <http://www.peacebuild.ca/working/?load=children>.

⁶⁴ CCIC members involved in the GPWG are South Asia Partnership — Canada, Philippine Development Assistance Program and CARE Canada.

CCIC members are also involved to a lesser extent in the “internally displaced persons” (IDPs) and “landmines” sub-components of the protection of civilians, where the forum for collaboration and discussion on this topic is the UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees).

Conflict prevention as another component of peacebuilding is also strongly represented in some members’ work and policy / advocacy pre-occupations, particularly the reduction of trade in small arms and the renunciation of “war economies” (e.g. trade in blood diamonds, employment of private security forces, etc.). Members and partners working in Africa, including those participating in the Roundtable on the Democratic Republic of Congo, are especially concerned by this issue. CPCC facilitates a separate Small Arms Working Group, while the “war economies” topic is included in the work of the broader Conflict Prevention Working Group (CPWG) of the CPCC.

The Small Arms Working Group (SAWG) seeks to engage the Canadian peace, disarmament, human rights and development NGO communities in the development and promotion of national and international policies and measures to reverse the diffusion and misuse of small arms and light weapons.⁶⁵ The working group seeks to keep members of the CPCC informed about ongoing work by Canadian and international agencies active on small arms issues, including transnational networks such as the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA). As well, the Working Group serves as a link between the NGO community and the Canadian government by engaging in policy dialogue with relevant departments.⁶⁶

The Conflict Prevention Working Group (CPWG) is an informal coalition of academics, activists and practitioners who aim to address the root causes of conflict.⁶⁷ Among other activities, the CPWG endeavours to encourage clarification of the language, theories and models of conflict prevention in a developmental context, foster interchange of techniques of conflict prevention and invite governments to incorporate conflict prevention into their policies and mandate.⁶⁸

The “peace support operations” component of the peacebuilding agenda is relevant to our members inasmuch as it deals with “civil-military co-operation” (CIMIC) aspects of operations in a humanitarian / conflict situation. The CPCC’s Peace Operations Working Group deals with this issue. However, while CPCC members address the issue as an aspect of the “Responsibility

⁶⁵ <http://www.peacebuild.ca/working/?load=smallarms>.

⁶⁶ CCIC members involved in the SAWG include: Alternatives, Canadian Friends Service Committee, Canadian Red Cross, CARE Canada, Christian Reformed World Relief Committee, CUSO, Inter Pares, Canadian Lutheran World Relief Services, Mennonite Central Committee Canada, Médecins sans frontières, Oxfam Canada, Peace Fund Canada, Physicians for Global Survival, Project Ploughshares, Save the Children Canada, South Asia Partnership Canada, UNICEF Canada, United Nations Association Canada, USC Canada, World Vision Canada and World University Service of Canada (WUSC).

⁶⁷ <http://www.peacebuild.ca/working/?load=conflictprevention>.

⁶⁸ CCIC members involved in the CPWG of CPCC are: Alternatives, CARE Canada, Philippine Development Assistance Program, Project Ploughshares, UNICEF Canada, World Federalists Movement — Canada and World Vision Canada. CCIC members interested in “war economies” work include Alternatives, Canadian Labour Congress, Development and Peace, Médecins sans frontières Canada, Mines Action Canada, Oxfam Canada, Oxfam-Québec, Primates World Relief and Development Fund, Project Ploughshares and World Vision Canada, to name a few.

to Protect” discussion, it is PAGER members that have expressed the most immediate interest in the CIMIC topic, approaching it from the angle of the militarisation of humanitarianism as mentioned above. This is an area of discussion that many members would find useful for clarifying roles and responsibilities to achieve operational clarity and efficiency in humanitarian / conflict theatres.

5.0 OPTIONS FOR CCIC POLICY FOCUS

5.1 CCIC’s Mandate and Resources

The overall goal of the 2004-2006 program of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation is:

To promote and strengthen the role of Civil Society in efforts to end global poverty and injustice.

CCIC will be realising this mandate by conducting research, disseminating information and creating learning opportunities for its members, focusing on national and international policy development, public communications and on policy engagement with relevant decision-makers. It dedicates staff time to policy research and analysis, as well as building in-house expertise in relevant policy areas. CCIC facilitates working group structures that link operational members’ programming and policy staff (of whom there are few). CCIC also derives benefit from international linkages that could be expanded around the humanitarian assistance / peacebuilding agenda through the Reality of Aid network. It can offer modest program resources (in the range of \$15,000 annually) to convene policy development processes with CCIC members and has additional capacities for communications with members and the media. Furthermore, CCIC grounds its policy work through engagement by various member Canadian “civil society organisations” (CSOs) in specific conflict situations: Sudan, West Africa, Congo, Africa Great Lakes region, Colombia, Guatemala, Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Over the years, CCIC has gained credibility with government decision-makers and participates in numerous exchanges with various divisions of CIDA and DFAIT.

Specifically with regard to peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance, CCIC’s *10-Point Agenda* provides a rationale. Point 6 relates to building peace: “Make the world safer for all people by collaborating with all of society to foster locally-rooted peacebuilding efforts for war-torn and war-threatened societies and to make common security and peacekeeping core objectives for Canadian Defence policy”. Referring to both war-torn and war-threatened societies means that pre-conflict, as well as conflict and post-conflict situations are included in CCIC’s peacebuilding pre-occupations.

Humanitarian assistance work is less directly addressed in the *10-Point Agenda*, but can be seen reflected in several points. Point 7 promotes sustainable food security; Point 2 aims to “make human rights central to the practice of Canadian foreign policy”, and Points 4 and 5 deal respectively with women (including ensuring women’s health and eradicating violence against women) and children (based on protecting their rights as set out in the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child).

Clearly, CCIC does have a mandate to support its members' work towards peace and their responses to complex humanitarian emergencies.

Historically, CCIC has addressed these themes at different times. It might be useful to recall two workshops conducted by CCIC in the mid-nineties. In 1995, a workshop of the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Fund proposed a broad Reference Group be formed to advise the CCIC Policy Team on issues such as:

- ◆ Reconstruction and rehabilitation frames of reference and criteria with all those involved in disaster, development and peacekeeping.
- ◆ Opening spaces in CIDA and DFAIT to influence their response patterns to emergencies, taking into account early warnings, preparedness and prevention approaches, and the militarisation of approaches to development and peace with a view to inserting a developmental approach.

In 1996 CCIC asked “Whose job is it?” at a workshop on policy development and the roles for NGOs and the military in complex emergencies (CCIC, March 1996). The workshop did not conclude with consensus among operational NGOs working in complex emergencies, nor among policy and advocacy NGOs who found themselves relating to a new government partner, the Department of National Defence (DND) along with their traditional partners, CIDA and DFAIT. Perhaps the most useful conclusion was that there was (and as PAGER confirmed in a September 2003 meeting, still is) a need to bridge the cultural gulf and understand the differences in operational methods between NGOs, the military, and DND in particular (p.3). It was recognised that strategic coordination, or at minimum mutual understanding, is desirable in key areas of policy and operations.

Within this historical background and given CCIC's capacities and resources, a number of possible areas of focus may offer strategic support for civil society engagement on policy development and advocacy in the area of humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding. It may be important to also keep in mind that CIDA's policy statement on “strengthening aid effectiveness”, *Canada Making a Difference in the World*, much of the work in fragile and failed states was implicitly left for non-governmental organisations to address (p. 17). Although at the time of preparing that policy statement, CIDA may not have been ready to focus on “failed states”, and sometimes referred to the OECD / DAC “prevention of terrorism” document would indicate that these “difficult partnerships” in fact may be given significant support.

Plans for the 2003-2004 program year are to engage CCIC members in a process of policy exploration on issues of humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding in order to enhance the policy work in these areas in a way that complements members' own priorities and policy work. Possible issues for exploration that are apparent from the preceding analysis include:

- ◆ Clarification of civil society roles and responsibilities in conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance, conflict resolution, peacebuilding and reconstruction vis-à-vis proposed expansion of roles of military and political personnel.
- ◆ Identification and clarification of principles underlying the delivery of humanitarian assistance (needs-based, rights-based) and the reclamation of humanitarian space.

-
- ◆ Definition of ODA criteria and the “prevention of terrorism” agenda; clarifying the contributions of aid in a “whole-of-government” approach for Canadian intervention in conflict and humanitarian crisis situations.
 - ◆ Learning how to effectively engage in building peace, in tandem with long-term development work based on members’ experiences and those of Southern partners.

These policy areas suggest several, not mutually exclusive, areas for focused policy work and advocacy with members over the next several years.

5.2 Options for Policy Work and Advocacy

These options for policy work should contribute toward the achievement of CCIC’s overall goal to strengthen roles for civil society. There may be a unique role for CCIC to play in bridging the strands of activity (conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding) and championing in a fresh way the necessity of ending poverty and injustice, while shaping with its members and partners in the South an over-arching policy approach for working together, especially in fragile and failed states. To accomplish this, CCIC must keep in clear view the strengths and the needs of its members. It must recognise that there are several coalitions in Canada which have been active for varying lengths of time and to varying degrees on a number of aspects of the issues raised in this paper and find ways to build synergy with these efforts.

With this context in mind, CCIC can champion:

- ◆ A holistic analysis of factors contributing to violent conflict and achieving peace.
- ◆ The validation of human relationships and the “humanisation” of citizens in the South.
- ◆ Resistance to a “security and terrorism” paradigm shift, so reminiscent of the Cold War, which would divide the world into “those with us or those against us”.

Following are three entry points that could be considered for policy research, discussion and advocacy by CCIC with its members and other interested organisations.

5.2.1 Clarifying Roles, Definitions, and Principles of Humanitarian Assistance

Taking up the points mentioned above, namely, the clarification of civil society roles and responsibilities and the identification and clarification of underlying principles, one option is to address the dilemmas of humanitarian action.

The debates and dilemmas of needs-based / rights-based humanitarian intervention require further dialogue within the CCIC membership and with other interested organisations, academics and policy decision-makers. Does a rights-based approach compromise humanitarian aid? How might our practice of humanitarian action be complementary with our advocacy for human rights in the context of humanitarian crises and conflicts? What roles could CCIC play?

These discussions would include the politicisation of humanitarian aid and the role of the military in development co-operation. What is at stake for civil society organisations? What part do (should) CSOs and governments play in situations of conflict and post-conflict or in fragile states? What are the implications on long-term development of the increase in funding to CSOs for humanitarian assistance? Is there work to be done in monitoring the application of SPHERE principals? What tools might assist CCIC members in dealing with these complex issues? Can CCIC contribute policy options to current government discussion of these issues (particularly within the context of the Canadian mission to Afghanistan)?

How might we get started?

- ◆ A group of CCIC members especially interested in humanitarian issues and key colleagues from other institutions could be called together to validate or modify the contents of this paper. Upon sharing of key papers and in-house policies or discussion papers, further input to setting out tasks for CCIC's Policy Team could be discussed.
- ◆ CCIC could look for synergy with CPCC working groups on Peace Support Operations and Conflict Prevention.
- ◆ It might be appropriate thereafter to prepare a policy position paper or (at minimum) a working paper to share with CIDA, DFAIT, DND.

Forums in which to address this issue:

- ◆ Initially, it would be important for CCIC to bring together members and especially participants in PAGER to get a reading on members' own positions.
- ◆ Gatherings of government and non-government persons from relevant departments and organisations, from International Development Research Centre, North-South Institute, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, as well as human rights advocacy groups with CCIC members would be necessary to build "cross-cultural" understanding and to clarify roles, terminology, etc.

5.2.2 ODA and the "Prevention of Terrorism" Agenda

A second policy option needing civil society monitoring and input is the "prevention of terrorism" agenda that the OECD / DAC presents, which also relates to "whole-of-government" approaches being explored by the Martin government. Up to now, much of the agenda seems to be discussed behind closed doors. There are indications that the DAC paper arrived at consensus with some difficulty and apparently debates continue between departments for development, foreign affairs and defence as to how flexible the ODA criteria ought to be.

What aspects of security system reform and capacity-building or counter-terrorism will be proposed for ODA eligibility? How does this agenda affect allocations to humanitarian aid, long-term development assistance and peacebuilding? What happens to the eradication of poverty as our goal of international co-operation? How might a northern agenda of "good governance" shaped by a counter-terrorism frame contribute to more repressive regimes and further erosion of human rights? Should we resist the integration of defence, diplomacy and development in one envelope — a situation that might leave security and / or Canadian strategic foreign policy goals defining the content of this envelope?

How might we get started?

- ◆ CCIC has already developed a commentary on the DAC document and worked with counterparts in the UK, Australia and other countries to address a common letter to our governments.⁶⁹
- ◆ Together with members, CCIC could follow up an initial discussion with government officials from CIDA and DFAIT — a CIDA officer, Canadian representative on the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, and a DFAIT officer from the International Crime and Terrorism Division.
- ◆ Develop a strategy to push back on the possible expansion of ODA eligibility criteria and the potential for a “whole-of-government” approach to be used as an argument for a common envelope for defence, diplomacy and development.
- ◆ As the Africa-Canada Forum did on the NEPAD (New Program for African Development), CCIC Policy Team could facilitate ways to hear the southern voice on these concerns.

Forums in which to address this issue:

- ◆ Working on this policy agenda would require monitoring developments and requesting meetings with CIDA, DFAIT and DND.
- ◆ Co-ordinate with CCIC’s counterpart in the UK, British Overseas NGOs for Development and others in the Security and Development Network.
- ◆ Facilitate discussions about long-term development issues in relation to the humanitarian and peacebuilding agendas with CPCC and PAGER.
- ◆ Host policy development working groups among the CCIC membership and roundtable discussions with government decision-makers.

5.2.3 Meaning and Scope for Building Peace

A third policy option perhaps best conceived as an area of learning is about how to effectively engage in building peace in tandem with long-term development work based on members’ experiences and those of Southern partners.

CCIC could work with members to clarify ways in which they can effectively engage in building peace, while identifying programming issues based on members’ and southern partners’ experiences. Issues here include ownership of the peacebuilding agenda — What kind of peace is being built and for whose benefit? The engagement of local civil society organisations and populations in responses to complex emergencies has not been adequately acknowledged. We could learn how to pay greater attention to their contributions to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

⁶⁹ Joint statement by members of the international Global Security and Development Network on the Development Assistance Committee policy statement and reference document: “A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Key Entry Points for Action”. October 2003.

Is peacebuilding distinct from long-term development and if so, how? In relation to this, it has been the experience of Canadian and international humanitarian agencies that responses to humanitarian crises, especially those in complex situations, continue to be hampered by inflexibility and gaps between funding structures. Should CCIC engage with CIDA in discussions about the need for funding transition activities?

How might we get started?

- ◆ A group of CCIC members especially interested in conflict prevention and peacebuilding issues, as well as key colleagues from other institutions could be called together to validate or modify the contents of this paper. Upon sharing of key papers and in-house policies or discussion papers, further input to setting out tasks for CCIC's Policy Team could be discussed with interested members.
- ◆ Share existing tools available on conflict-sensitive approaches, conflict analysis and local capacities for peace. Develop tools to guide integration or mainstreaming of these approaches into long-term development and justice work.

Forums in which to address this issue:

- ◆ In this area of work, CCIC could also look for synergy with CPCC working groups on Conflict Prevention and on Peace Support Operations, by perhaps conducting combined learning circles, again with a view to keeping front and centre the goal to end poverty and injustice.
- ◆ CCIC could bring together its membership with other institutions such as North-South Institute, IDRC and Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, as well as human rights advocacy institutions to share learning on current research and methodology.
- ◆ Government interlocutors — DFAIT, DND, CIDA — with a goal to advocate for the building of peace with, by, and for the people of the South.

6.0 SUMMARY

The objectives of this paper were to:

- 1) Outline the context of current policy issues in humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding as it applies to the over-arching goals of poverty reduction and human security; and
- 2) Set out some options for CCIC to enhance its policy and advocacy programs in these areas.

The paper described two types of context in which humanitarian action and peacebuilding are currently conducted: the operational contexts of geopolitics and socio-economic environments, and the conceptual context of definitions and frames of reference for humanitarian assistance and building peace. The changing nature of conflicts since the end of the Cold War, international economic policies and the relatively new “war on terrorism” are critical factors in shaping the context for humanitarian and development workers. This context also has shaped some of the frames of reference within which we work, in particular the definitions of humanitarianism and peacebuilding.

The third section of the paper suggested that there are four main impacts of the operational and conceptual contexts: an increased politicisation of humanitarian aid; a setting of new goals for development assistance; the undermining of the legal framework for human rights and international norms; and a global amnesia about other major humanitarian crises as the “war on terrorism” dominates the international agenda. In the fourth section, a characterisation of non-governmental agencies with regards to humanitarian aid and peacebuilding was offered.

In conclusion, the paper outlined what CCIC offers to its members and proposed three possible areas of work, from among which CCIC could choose to its policy and advocacy efforts (limited resources preclude taking up all areas). This paper is intended as starting point for discussion with CCIC members and other relevant institutions and persons to shape this work for the coming program period.

APPENDIX 1 — LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACFOA	Australian Council for Overseas Aid
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BOND	British Overseas NGOs for Development
CACWG	Children and Armed Conflict Working Group (of CPCC)
CAFOD	Catholic Organisation for Overseas Development (UK)
CCIC	Canadian Council for International Co-operation
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
CPCC	Canadian Peacebuilding Co-ordination Committee
CPWG	Conflict Prevention Working Group (of CPCC)
CRC	Canadian Red Cross
CSO	Civil society organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DfID	Department for International Development (UK)
DI	Development Initiatives
DND	Department for National Defence
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU	European Union
EOSC	Emergency Operations Response Center
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GPWG	Gender and Peacebuilding Working Group (of CPCC)
HA	Humanitarian assistance
HPG	Humanitarian Policy Group (of ODI)
IANSA	International Action Network on Small Arms

ICASA	International Conference on AIDS and STIs in Africa
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally displaced persons
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IHA	International Humanitarian Assistance (CIDA)
IHL	International humanitarian law
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MSF	Médecins sans frontières
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD	New Program for African Development
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute (UK)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAGER	Policy Action Group on Emergency Response
PB	Peacebuilding
SAP	South Asia Partnership — Canada
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programs
SAWG	Small Arms Working Group (CPCC)
SCHR	Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (Sphere Project)
STI	Sexually transmitted infections
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
US / USA	United States of America
WUSC	World University Service of Canada

APPENDIX 2 — LIST OF ORGANISATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED

Consultations took place between late October and early December 2002. Accuracy of personnel associated with organisations was current at that time. (Excerpted from François Legault, December 2002.)

Both CPCC and PAGER Members:

- | | |
|--|--|
| Alternatives | ◆ Charles Mugiraneza, Chargé de projets |
| Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI) | ◆ Julia Sanchez (HA)
◆ Thérèse Bouchard, Director, Human Rights / Democratic Development (PB) |
| CARE Canada | ◆ Nicolas Palanque, Emergency Programmes Manager, Overseas Operations (HA)
◆ Nevin Orange, Programme Officer (PB) |
| Médecins sans frontières Canada (MSF) | ◆ Lai-Ling Lee, Program Manager (HA) |
| Mennonite Central Committee-Canada | ◆ Bill Janzen, Director, Ottawa Office (PB+HA)
◆ Justine Foxall, Deputy Director, International Programs, Ottawa Office (PB+HA)
◆ Willie Reimer, Director, Food, Disaster, Material Resources (HA) |
| Oxfam Canada | ◆ Rex Fyles, Emergencies and Special Projects Officer (HA+PB)
◆ Mark Fried, Democratic Rights, Americas Program & Advocacy Coordinator (PB)
◆ Mel Peters, Emergencies and Special Projects Officer (HA+PB) |
| UNICEF Canada | ◆ Cathie Guthrie, Director, International Programs (PB +HA) |
| World Vision Canada | ◆ Kathy Vandergrift, Senior Analyst, Advocacy and Public Policy (PB)
◆ Rupen Das, Director, Humanitarian Assistance (HA) |

CPCC Members:

- | | |
|--|--|
| Canadian Friends Service Committee | ◆ Jane Orion Smith, Coordinator
◆ Gianne Broughton, International Programme Associate |
| CUSO | ◆ Debby Côté, Project Development Officer |
| International Development and Relief Foundation (IDRC) | ◆ Stephanie Apollonio, Program Officer |
| Peacefund Canada | ◆ Michael Call, Program Administrator |
| Philippine Development Assistance Program (PDAP) | ◆ Peachy Forbes, Executive Director |
| Physicians for Global Survival (PSG) | ◆ Debbie Grisdale, Executive Director |
| Primate's World Relief and Development Fund | ◆ Charlotte Maxwell, Development Coordinator, East and Southern Africa
◆ Andrew Ignatieff, Executive Director, also Chair, CCIC Board |
| Project Ploughshares | ◆ Ernie Regehr, Director |
| South Asia Partnership – Canada (SAP) | ◆ Faruq Faisal, Canadian Program Manager |
| United Nations Association in Canada | ◆ Steve Mason, Executive Director |
| World Federalists of Canada | ◆ Fergus Watt, Executive Director |

PAGER Members:

- | | |
|---|---|
| Canadian Foodgrains Bank Association Inc. | ◆ Jim Cornelius, Executive Director
◆ Jim Davis |
| Canadian Lutheran World Relief | ◆ Enock Oduro
◆ Jack Sterken, National Reconciliation Program, Burma |
| Canadian Red Cross (CRC) | ◆ Susan Johnson, National Director, International Programs (also PAGER Group Co-Chair) (HA) |
| Oxfam-Québec | ◆ Chantal Vallée (HA) |
| Save the Children Canada | ◆ Tony Parmar (Also PAGER Group Co-Chair) |
| Development and Peace (not yet a member but maybe soon) | ◆ Robert Letendre, Executive Director |

Neither CPCC nor PAGER Members:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| Christian Children's Fund of Canada | ◆ Abebaw Assefa, Operations Manager
◆ John Popiel, Operations Manager |
|-------------------------------------|--|

Other Key Actors:

- Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC) ♦ David Lord, Coordinator (PB)
- Emergency Operations Support Center (EOSC) ♦ Charlie K. Musoka, Analyst, Emergency Operations Support Center (HA)
- Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC) ♦ Anne Buchanan, CCIC Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Fund
- International Development and Research Centre (IDRC) ♦ Stephen Baranyi, Senior Program Specialist, Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Program Initiative — Program and Partnership Branch (PB)
- Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) ♦ Jean-March Mangin, Chief of Operations-Policy & Systems, IHA Directorate, Multilateral Programmes Branch (HA)
♦ Hongwon Yu, Program Officer, ERU, IHA Directorate, Multilateral Programmes Branch (HA)
♦ Solveig Schuster, Senior Program Officer, Peacebuilding Unit, Multilateral Branch (PB)
- Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) ♦ Elissa A. Golberg, Senior Policy Advisor, Humanitarian Affairs (HA)
♦ Don Hubert, Senior Policy Advisor, Peacebuilding and Human Security Division (PB)
- North-South Institute ♦ Stephen Baranyi, Coordinator, Peacebuilding Programme
- CANADEM — Canadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights ♦ Paul Larose-Edwards, Executive Director (PB+HA)

APPENDIX 3 — HUMANITARIAN WORK ENVIRONMENT

PAGER described the **environment** in which humanitarian NGOs are working since the late 1990s as having the following characteristics (Legault, December 2003):

- ◆ Increasing work in conflict zones and post-conflict zones;
- ◆ Violence, lack of rules, insecurity, lack of compliance with “international humanitarian law” (IHL), including Geneva conventions;
- ◆ Emerging roles for NGOs in political solutions;
- ◆ The North is clearly being implicated in the creation and perpetuation of conflicts;
- ◆ Growth in numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees;
- ◆ Political action and processes are becoming more important than humanitarian assistance alone;
- ◆ Need for NGOs to do advocacy work and be politically informed;
- ◆ Credibility of humanitarian NGOs increased;
- ◆ Internationalisation of NGOs;
- ◆ Changing political environment since 1989 (end of the Cold War) and political role NGOs take in that vacuum (lack of neutrality, economic interests);
- ◆ Growth of corporate power and role in humanitarian crises;
- ◆ Rights-based programming increasingly taken up by NGOs.

The PAGER Group includes:

- ◆ Alternatives
- ◆ Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI)
- ◆ Canadian Foodgrains Bank Association Inc.
- ◆ Canadian Lutheran World Relief
- ◆ Canadian Red Cross
- ◆ CARE Canada
- ◆ Development and Peace (Canadian Catholic Organisation for Development and Peace)
- ◆ Médecins sans frontières
- ◆ Mennonite Central Committee Canada
- ◆ Oxfam Canada
- ◆ Oxfam-Québec
- ◆ Save the Children Canada
- ◆ UNICEF Canada
- ◆ As well as representatives from DFAIT and CIDA

APPENDIX 4 — CIDA DISBURSEMENTS OF IHA AND EMERGENCY FOOD AID

CIDA Disbursements of International Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Food Aid

Year	Estimate of Food Aid for Emergencies	Total CIDA Humanitarian Assistance / Food Aid for Emergencies	Percentage of CIDA Disbursements
	Millions of Canadian dollars		
2001-2002	\$ 66.7	\$ 205.7	10.4 %
2000-2001	119.7	237.5	12.0
1999-2000	110.8	224.2	11.6
1998-1999	149.2	238.1	13.1
1997-1998	144.6	242.6	14.7
1996-1997	198.7	272.6	15.3
1995-1996	180.0	251.5	14.2
1994-1995	289.2	341.6	18.2
1993-1994	241.2	332.4	16.8
1992-1993	282.0	400.8	18.0
1991-1992	285.6	397.2	17.0
1990-1991	262.2	373.3	16.8
1985-1986	229.3	270.7	16.6

Source: CIDA, Statistical Report on Official Development Assistance, various fiscal years.

Note: Total disbursements for CIDA Humanitarian Assistance / Emergency Food Aid is an estimate which includes:

- 1) Bilateral Humanitarian Assistance
- 2) Multilateral Humanitarian Assistance
- 3) Landmines Fund
- 4) Multilateral Food Aid (World Food Program),
- 5) Forty percent of bilateral food aid (based on an estimate of bilateral food aid devoted to emergencies that was published by the DAC peer review of Canadian aid in 1998). The remaining proportion of food aid is disbursed for long-term development efforts.
- 6) Canadian Partnership Branch Disbursements to the Red Cross
- 7) Geographic Programs Projects coded as Emergency / Humanitarian Assistance

NGOs and Emergency Food Aid and International Humanitarian Assistance

There are no accurate statistics on the proportion of IHA / Emergency Food Aid disbursed through Canadian NGOs. Based on detailed disbursements for 1998-1999 for CIDA program by categories of implementing partners, it was estimated that NGOs implemented approximately 34 percent of the IHA / Emergency Food Aid disbursements for that year.

These disbursements by NGOs made up 25 percent of total CIDA program disbursements by NGOs in that year. As a reference point NGOs disbursed 19 percent of all CIDA program for that year.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA). *Aid Budget 2003-04 Overview and Analysis*. May 2003. www.acfoa.asn.au.
- British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND), July 2003. *Global Security and Development BOND Discussion paper*. <http://www.bond.org.uk/pubs/advocacy/gsdpaper.pdf>.
- Bush, Kenneth D. *Dealing with Humanitarian Crises: The civilianization of peacekeeping or the militarization of humanitarian assistance?* Kingston, Canada: Queen's University, 1996.
- Campbell, Bonnie. *Defining New Development Options and New Social Compromises in the Context of Reduced Political Space: Reflections on the Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire*. March 2003. Paper presented at the September 2003 Africa-Canada Forum Symposium.
- Canada. Canadian International Development Agency. *Canada Making A Difference in the World: A Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness*. September 2002.
- Canada. Canadian International Development Agency. *Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative: Strategic Framework*. Ottawa: 2002. <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/>
- Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security*. Ottawa: 2002.
- Canadian Council for International Co-operation. **in common** *Global Action against Poverty: The 10-Point Agenda*. Ottawa: 1998.
- Canadian Council for International Co-operation. *Whose Job Is It?: Policy Development and the Roles for NGOs and the Military in Complex Emergencies*. Ottawa: CCIC, 1996.
- Chandler, David. "The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped a New Humanitarian Agenda," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 23, 2001, pp 678-700.
- Charoonpatarapong, Chirawatana. "War against Liberties", Focus on the Global South, www.suaram.org/apsn
- Curtis, Devon. *Humanitarian Policy Action Group Report 10: Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and Dissension*. London: Overseas Development Institute, 2001.
- Development Initiatives. *Global Humanitarian Assistance 2003*. London: Humanitarian Financing Work Programme, 2003.
- Evans, Gareth. "The Responsibility to Protect: When it's right to fight," *Progressive Politics*, Vol 2.2, pp. 68-72, July 2003.
- Forum Asia Statement. *ASEAN Governments Create More Terrorism through Violence and Repression, say activists*, at ASEAN Summit, Bali, October 6, 2003;
- Hilhorst, Dorothea and Nadja Schmiemann. "Humanitarian principles and organisational culture: everyday practice in Médecins Sans Frontières-Holland." *Development in Practice*, Volume 12, Numbers 3 & 4, August 2002, pp 490-500.

IBON Foundation and BOND. November 2003. *Development and the 'war on terrorism', a working paper designed to accompany a BOND Seminar entitled The 'war on terrorism' A Battle for Development?* (19 November 2003). For further details about the Seminar and BOND's work on Global Security and Development go to:
<http://www.bond.org.uk/advocacy/globalsecurity.htm>.

International Development Centre. *What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Reflections on the State of Peacebuilding Ten Years After the Agenda for Peace*. Working Paper No. 7. Ottawa: January 2003.

International Commission on Intervention on State Security. *The Responsibility to Protect Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*. Ottawa, Canada: 2001.

Ismi, Asad. *Canadian Mining Companies Destroy Environment and Community Resources in Ghana*. MiningWatch Canada / Mines Alert, Ottawa: July, 2003.

Joint statement by members of the international Global Security and Development Network on the Development Assistance Committee policy statement and reference document: 'A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Key Entry Points for Action'. October 10, 2003.

Joulwan, George A. and Christopher C. Shoemaker. *Civilian-Military Co-operation in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict: Implementing agreements in Bosnia and Beyond*. A report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1998.

Legault, François. *Draft CCIC Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding Policy work: Strategic Directions Paper*. CCIC, Ottawa: December 2002.

Longley, Catherine and Daniel Maxwell. *Livelihoods, Chronic Conflict and Humanitarian Response: A Synthesis of Current Practice*. Working Paper 182, Overseas Development Institute, London: June 2003.

Lund, Michael. *What kind of peace is Being Built? Taking Stock of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Charting Future Directions. A Discussion Paper for the International Development Research Centre*. Ottawa, Canada: January, 2003.

Macrae, Joanna and Adele Harmer, eds. *Humanitarian Policy Action Group Report 14: Humanitarian action and the 'global war on terror': a review of trends and issues*. July 2003.

Macrae, Joanna, ed. Chapter 1 Analysis and Synthesis. *Humanitarian Policy Action Group Report 11: The new humanitarianisms: a review of trends in global humanitarian action*. London: Overseas Development Institute, 2002.

Miller, Robert, ed. *Aid as Peacemaker Canadian Development Assistance and Third World Conflict*. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, Inc., 1992.

NGOs and Peacebuilding: Lessons Learned and Next Steps. Conference Report by Peggy Teale, Coordinator, Ad Hoc Working Group on NGOs and Peacebuilding, November 21-23, 1995. Ottawa: 1995.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) / Development Assistance Committee (DAC). *A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Key Entry Points for Action, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series*. April 2003. Available at: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/4/16085708.pdf>

Partnership Africa Canada. *The Diamonds and Human Security Project*, Occasional Papers Series available at <http://www.pacweb.org>

Plewes, Betty. *Peace and Disarmament Groups and the Public Policy Process: An Environmental Scan*. (Unpublished paper). Ottawa: July 2003.

Randel, Judith and Tony German. Chapter 2: Trends in the financing of humanitarian assistance. *Humanitarian Policy Action Group Report 11: The new humanitarianisms: a review of trends in global humanitarian action*. London: Overseas Development Institute, 2002.

Reiff, David. "Taking up the American's burden," *The Globe and Mail* [Toronto], September 30, 2003.

Reindorp, Nicola. Chapter 3: Trends and challenges in the UN humanitarian system. *Humanitarian Policy Action Group Report 11: The new humanitarianisms: a review of trends in global humanitarian action*. London: Overseas Development Institute, 2002.

Saunders, Doug. "The fourth world war," *The Globe and Mail* [Toronto], September 6, 2003, pp. F6-7.

Smillie, Ian and Larry Minear. *The Quality of Money: Donor Behavior in Humanitarian Financing. An independent study*. Somerville, MA: Humanitarianism and War Project, Tufts University, 2003.

Stevenson, Frances. *Book Review — The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*. Canada: IDRC, December 2001. Available at: <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2422>.

Stoddard, Abby. Chapter 3 Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges and Trends. *Humanitarian Policy Action Group Report 14*. London: Overseas Development Institute, July 2003.

Tomlinson, Brian. *A CCIC Commentary on "A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Key Entry Points of Action"*. Canadian Council for International Co-operation, Ottawa. October 2003.

Tomlinson, Brian. *Directions for Canadian Foreign Policy in the Post-Chrétien Era: A CCIC Briefing Paper*. Canadian Council for International Co-operation, Ottawa. September 2003.

United Nations. 2003. <http://www.un.org/News/dh/hlpanel/press-release-041103.pdf>.

Whelan, Susan. "Advancing Human Security: The Role of Technology and Politics." The 53rd conference on Science and World Affairs, Halifax and Pugwash, Canada, July 17, 2003.

World Disasters Report 2002. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Geneva: 2002.